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INTRODUCTION
We live in an “administrative state.” 1 Civil servants and political appointees make rules of general applicability, adjudicate
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1. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1879 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state
cannot be dismissed.”); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (“ The growth of the Executive Branch . . . heightens
the concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of
the people. This concern is largely absent from the dissent’s paean to the administrative state.”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
755 (2002) (“ The Framers, who envisioned a limited Federal Government, could
not have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state.”). See generally JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 12 (1985) (“It
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individual cases, and enforce the laws within complex, hierarchical organizations. At the same time, we are committed to
democratic-constitutional principles, which require that “We the
people” remain the authors of the laws that bind us. 2 Bureaucracy can serve democratic governance because the public purposes outlined by statute often require “administrative machinery” to come into force. 3 But democracy is also seen to conflict
with the delegation of discretionary authority to administrative
institutions, since bureaucratic decision-makers stand removed
from electoral accountability. 4
The latest doctrinal expression of this conflicted partnership
between democracy and bureaucracy is the major questions doctrine.5 This doctrine is a prominent exception to the general
principle of judicial deference to administrative interpretations
of statutory ambiguities. 6 Courts will normally afford agency in-

is not only trite, it is no longer sufficient to say that we have a cradle-to-grave
administrative, welfare state. Administrators make decisions that affect us
from before the cradle to beyond the grave.”); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and
the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983) (“[A] conception of public administration free from judicial oversight would have damaged the fundamental political axiom of limited government and thus undermined in advance
a principal buttress for the legitimacy of the modern ‘administrative state.’”).
2. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
3. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 263 (1918) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
4. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 131–34 (1980) (“ The point is not that such ‘faceless bureaucrats’
necessarily do a bad job as our effective legislators. It is rather that they are
neither elected nor reelected . . . .”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 289–300 (2d ed. 1979); WILLIAM SCHEUERMAN, BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL AND THE RULE OF LAW 1–3 (1994) (“If state action is to be rendered
normatively legitimate, many of the giants of modern political thought argue,
we need to make sure that law takes a form capable of carefully regulating bureaucrats. . . . Poorly constrained state action undermines political and social
autonomy.”).
5. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 990–95 (2013) (“[T]he major
questions doctrine [has] been described as ‘Marbury’s revenge,’ an effort to reclaim some of the judicial power that Chevron shifted to agencies.”); Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 236–45 (2006) (discussing the development of the major questions principle and the conflicting opinions on the
proper authority for and application of the doctrine).
6. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If Congress
has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
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terpretations of such ambiguities some degree of weight or deference, depending on the level of authority Congress has delegated to the agency and the formality of the procedure through
which such interpretations have been issued. 7 However, in a series of cases in the past three decades, the Supreme Court has
held that where a statutory ambiguity raises a question of great
“economic and political significance,” it will presume that Congress did not intend the agency to resolve the issue. 8 Instead, the
Court will resolve the ambiguity itself, without giving any
weight or deference to the agency’s position. 9
The major questions doctrine has played a key role in recent,
high-profile cases. In King v. Burwell, 10 the Supreme Court refused to defer to the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) interpretation of the Affordable Care Act’s provision of tax credits for
health insurance purchased through “an Exchange established
by the State.” 11 The Court noted that this provision was “among
the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of dollars” and affecting
the health insurance coverage of millions of Americans. 12 The
interpretation of this provision therefore raised questions of such
“deep economic and political significance,” that the Court presumed Congress did not intend the IRS to resolve them. 13 “This
is not a case for the IRS. It is instead our task to determine the

authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”); Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, at 990 (“[T]he major questions doctrine presumes that Congress does not intend to delegate interpretive
authority over major policy questions to an agency, even if it leaves a statutory
ambiguity.”).
7. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding
that agency interpretations are entitled to “Chevron deference when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law”); id. at 234 (explaining further that some deference is still
given to the agency interpretation, despite falling outside of Chevron deference,
in proportion to the agency’s “specialized experience and broader investigations
and information”).
8. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp.
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 147 (2000).
9. E.g., King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
10. Id.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (refusing to
defer to the IRS’s interpretation because of the major question implicated by the
statutory ambiguity).
12. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
13. Id.
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correct reading . . . .” 14
In Texas v. United States, 15 the Fifth Circuit likewise found
that the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(DAPA) program was likely unlawful, in part, because it “undoubtedly implicates question[s] of ‘deep economic and political
significance.’” 16 If Congress had wished to give DHS authority to
defer removal proceedings for over four million undocumented
immigrants, “it surely would have done so expressly.” 17
These cases show that, in spite of its relatively spare use to
date,18 the major questions doctrine has significant implications
for both social policy and constitutional structure. The doctrine
channels constitutional power by reserving to the judiciary, rather than the executive, authority to settle questions that statutory law has left unresolved. Because the doctrine is triggered by
a court’s perception that the interpretive question at issue is politically salient, it authorizes judicial policymaking on precisely
those issues that have the highest visibility for the American
public. The doctrine therefore licenses judicial intervention in
14. Id.
15. 809 F.3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2016).
16. Id. at 181 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
17. Id.
18. The major questions doctrine continues to be discussed and invoked in
the lower courts. E.g., U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 382 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (denying a rehearing en banc in challenge to the FCC’s “Open Internet
Order,” where concurring and dissenting opinions joined issue on the application of the major questions doctrine to the Order); ClearCorrect Operating, LLC
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (O’Malley, J., concurring) (rejecting the International Trade Commission’s interpretation of articles, under the Tariff Act of 1930, to encompass electronic transmissions of data,
in part on the grounds that “[i]f Congress intended for the Commission to regulate one of the most important aspects of modern-day life, Congress surely
would have said so expressly”); U.S. House of Reps. v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d
165, 188 (D.D.C. 2016) (withholding deference to the Treasury Department’s
interpretation of the Affordable Care Act with regard to appropriations for subsidies on the grounds that it was a major question and “[t]here was no express
delegation here”); cf. Chamber of Commerce v. Hugler, 231 F. Supp. 3d 152,
178–79 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (discussing major questions, but refusing to apply it,
instead granting summary judgment for the Department of Labor in challenge
to its “fiduciary rule,” and distinguishing major questions cases on the grounds
that Congress had “clearly . . . assigned the DOL the power to regulate a significant portion of the American economy, which the DOL has done since the statute was enacted”). For a discussion and critique of major questions adjudication
in the lower courts, see generally Michael Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts,
Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777 (2017).
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intensely political disputes.
The major questions doctrine deserves close examination
not only because it enlarges the judiciary’s policymaking power,
but also because it succinctly encapsulates a deeply entrenched
ideology of administrative law and bureaucratic legitimacy. The
doctrine presumes that the reasonable legislator would not have
wanted a bureaucratic body to settle policy questions that were
left unanswered by statutory law. 19 Administrative agencies, in
this view, are treated as purely technocratic institutions, which
are meant only to find the best means to achieve legislative
goals. 20 The courts, by contrast, are treated as the guardians of
principle and policy, who stand ready to prevent over-zealous executive officials from usurping legislative power. These assumptions are rooted in an antibureaucratic philosophy of the modern
state, which is visible in significant strands of scholarly literature and in some important case law.21 By reconstructing the rationale for the major questions doctrine, we can better understand and assess the premises of this legal and political
philosophy.
The major questions doctrine is best explained as an attempt to reinforce democratic-constitutional values. In practice,
however, it undermines such values by failing to respect the deliberative capacities of administrative agencies. I present a Progressive understanding of the state that recognizes agencies’
democratic virtues. I then propose a modification to the major
questions doctrine that would reinforce, rather than impair,
agencies’ discursive and participatory functions.
The jurisprudential foundation for the major questions doctrine is the constitutional principle that Congress may not delegate policymaking authority to another actor without providing
an “intelligible principle” to guide and constrain the exercise of
that authority. 22 This “nondelegation doctrine” protects legislative prerogatives by striking down statutes that do not adequately delimit the exercise of administrative discretion. The
major questions doctrine takes a less extreme approach. Instead
of simply abrogating unconstitutionally broad grants of administrative authority, the major questions doctrine requires courts
to interpret regulatory statutes so as to narrow the discretion
19.
20.
21.
22.

Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, at 990.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
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they allocate to administrative bodies. The judiciary can thus respect Congress’s general legislative choice to intervene in a given
policy area, but prevent administrative agencies from addressing fundamental political questions.
The broader normative justification for the major questions
doctrine is to reinforce democratic legitimacy. The doctrine presumes that democracy will be enhanced if administrative agencies do not make important value choices. 23 This presumption is
based upon two auxiliary premises. The first premise, which can
be traced to the great scholars of the Legal Process School, is that
the courts are and should be the primary interpreters of the principles and policies enacted in legislation. 24 The second assumption, which can be traced to Max Weber’s sociology of law, is that
bureaucracy is and should be an efficient, neutral instrument for
implementing goals established by statute.25
I argue that these auxiliary premises are descriptively inaccurate and normatively unappealing. As a descriptive matter,
they fail to account for salient features of our current institutional regime: that agencies do, in fact, often make important
value choices, and that agencies’ procedural mechanisms and institutional position can promote deliberative, inclusive, and rational decision-making. 26 As a normative matter, therefore,
these premises fail to recognize that administrative policymaking may increase, rather than detract from, the democratic legitimacy of state action.
I present a Progressive theory of the administrative state
that better captures this democracy-enhancing aspect of our administrative procedure. I call this theory Progressive because it
was authored by American Progressives like John Dewey, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow, who first advocated expansive
national regulatory power in the United States. 27 Such Progressive conceptions of the American state have received renewed
attention in recent years, not only from scholars who broadly
support their vision of democratically authorized administrative

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV.B.
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regulation, 28 but also from those who trace the decline of American constitutionalism to Progressivism. 29 Legal scholarship,
however, continues to operate under misapprehensions about
the content and commitments of Progressivism, usually emphasizing only the Progressive concern with bureaucratic expertise.30 This paper therefore reassesses the “original intent” of the
Progressives to explain how the state can remain democratic,
even when unelected bureaucrats make important policy
choices.
The Progressives followed the German philosopher G.W.F.
Hegel in understanding the state as an institution that guarantees individual and collective freedom through expert regulation
and social-welfare provision. 31 But, unlike Hegel, they argued
that administration must be informed by public opinion. 32 They
believed that agencies could augment the popular legitimacy of
the state by bringing the input of the affected parties to bear in
crafting regulatory policy. 33 They therefore advocated for a state
that would maximize both deliberative engagement and programmatic efficiency. The institutional architecture of our administrative state reflects significant aspects of the Progressive
vision.34
This Progressive theory of administration is capacious. It incorporates aspects of the other theories that have been advanced

28. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1337–45 (2016) (discussing Progressive Era
political and legal thought as an intellectual foundation for using administration to combat social domination and promote democratic engagement).
29. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL?
447–78 (2014) (identifying the American Progressives as originating our administrative law and disregarding constitutional principles of the rule of law and
democratic control of policy decisions).
30. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 223–25 (1992) (discussing
the development of “the Progressives’ increasing admiration of the professional
expert whose skill, neutrality, and impartiality formed an alternative to both
the demagoguery and corruption of American democratic politics and the unmitigated self-interest of marketplace ethics”).
31. See infra Part IV.A.
32. See infra Part IV.A.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
34. See infra Part IV.
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to justify the administrative state, such as legislative democracy, 35 expertise, 36 interest-group pluralism, 37 civic republicanism,38 and presidentialism. 39 But it situates and relativizes each
of these theories within a general concept of the state. In the
Progressive theory, the state is the institutional articulation of
democratic discourse. This is a normative rather than merely descriptive concept. The structures of the state should reflect, refine, and ultimately enforce value commitments that emerge
from an open and contested process of “political will-formation”
in the public sphere. 40
Administrative agencies play a pivotal role within this state.
Their function is not merely to carry out an already specified political program, but rather to incorporate the perspectives of
multiple actors who possess partial democratic authority. Thus,
while acknowledging the President’s role in overseeing administrative action, the Progressive theory insulates administrative
decision-making from complete presidential control, so as to
35. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 40 (1982) (arguing that legislators’ broad powers allow them to make “value choices,” which
agencies have to carry out).
36. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23–24 (1938)
(“[ F ]or the art of regulating an industry requires [expertise]. . . . If the administrative process is to fill the need for expertness, obviously, as regulation increases, the number of our administrative authorities must increase.”).
37. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) (arguing that affording participation in
agency decision-making by all interested parties will create better agency decisions).
38. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (“[H]aving administrative
agencies set government policy provides the best hope of implementing civic republicanism’s call for deliberate decision making informed by the values of the
entire polity.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985) (“[I]n its belief in a deliberative conception of
democracy, [republicanism] provides a basis for evaluating administrative and
legislative action that has both powerful historical roots and considerable contemporary appeal.”).
39. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245,
2251 (2001) (arguing that presidents should guide agency decision-making because it would promote accountability for agency decisions and create more effective agency decisions); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and
Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 471–72 (1985) (concluding that presidential control over the administrative state is the best way
to solve the problem of unbounded agency discretion).
40. Jürgen Habermas, Three Normative Models of Democracy, 1 CONSTELLATIONS 1, 5 (1994). The view I advance here generally aligns with Habermas’s
deliberative-democratic political theory, but departs from his instrumental-rational understanding of the administrative process. See infra Part III.B.
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leave space for other voices to influence the choice of policy.
Though it recognizes the importance of efficient bureaucratic
performance, the Progressive theory presses a countervailing
need for public participation and discursive reasoning in administrative decision-making. By encouraging rational policy development between the legislature, executive, and the public at
large, the Progressive theory aims to enhance the democratic legitimacy of state action. This process of institutional deliberation
can also reduce the arbitrariness of any given expression of democratic will—such as a presidential policy preferences that cannot claim a wide constituency—by bringing it into dialogue with
other, conflicting understandings of public needs and values.
This theory is not “progressive” in the sense that it necessarily entails the adoption of contemporary liberal or left-wing
political values. While the Progressive state is functionally
suited to promote various forms of social and economic equality,
it might also be deployed for certain substantively conservative
policies, such as the promotion of competitive markets. But Progressivism insists that any such political agendas be authorized
through a deliberative-democratic process that draws on the institutional resources of the administrative apparatus.
This Progressive understanding motivates a reformulation
of the major questions doctrine. I suggest that courts should calibrate their deference to an agency’s resolution of a major question to the deliberative quality of the agency’s policymaking processes. Courts should assess: (1) the degree to which the agency
has responded to the affected public in making its policy choice;
and (2), the degree to which the agency has addressed the relevant questions of political value. Normally, use of the notice-andcomment rulemaking procedure should suffice to demonstrate
significant engagement with the affected public. But use of the
rulemaking procedure should be neither necessary nor sufficient
for judicial deference. Even if the agency proceeds through informal rulemaking, courts must ensure that the agency’s explanation of its policy choice actually addresses the political controversies its interpretation implicates. If the interpretation is not
issued through rulemaking, courts should nonetheless give
weight to the agency’s view proportional to the deliberative credentials of the antecedent decision-making procedure.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, I trace the development of the major questions doctrine as an exception to
Chevron deference. In Part II, I reconstruct the rationale for the
doctrine, arguing that it is best understood as reinforcing the
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nondelegation doctrine and, more fundamentally, deliberative
democratic control over political choices. In Part III, I argue that
the major questions doctrine rests on two auxiliary assumptions:
first, that courts are the best interpreters of the principles and
policies enacted in legislation; and, second, that agencies should
serve as value-neutral, technocratic implementers of policies established definitively by courts and the legislature. In Part IV, I
suggest an alternative model of administration, based on Progressive political thought, which emphasizes the discursive role
agencies can play in synthesizing expressions of public opinion
in the form of legislation, presidential input, and public participation. In Part V, I argue that this Progressive theory better
comports with our current institutional regime than the courtcentric and technocratic assumptions of the major questions doctrine. In Part VI, I deploy this alternative understanding to propose a revision to the major questions doctrine. I then demonstrate how this modified approach would apply to the major
questions cases.
I. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: A DEPARTURE
FROM THE TRADITIONAL REGIME OF JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE
In this Part, I introduce the major questions doctrine as an
exception to the general presumption that agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities are owed at least some level of
weight or deference. In Section A, I outline the general administrative-law doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. In Section B, I introduce the major questions cases,
describing how the doctrine evolved from a qualified presumption against reading marginal statutory provisions to license
broad delegations into an unqualified presumption against any
form of delegation concerning politically important matters.
A. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES
The major questions doctrine is a departure from the general rule that courts will give some degree of weight or deference
to agency interpretations of the statutes they are charged with
administering. 41 Courts invoked this principle throughout the
nineteenth century, before the proliferation of administrative
41. See supra note 6.
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tasks had become an issue of major political and legal contention.42 For instance, in United States v. Moore,43 the Court
stated: “The construction given to a statute by those charged
with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration, and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.” 44 The rule was not absolute, but turned on a set
of contextual factors, such as the continuity of agency interpretation, and whether the agency interpretation was nearly cooriginal with the organic act itself.45
42. E.g., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900) (“[A Treasury] regulation . . . should not be disregarded or annulled unless, in the judgment of the
court, it is plainly and palpably inconsistent with law. Those who insist that
such a regulation is invalid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court
has no choice except to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority and
employed means that are not at all appropriate to the end specified in the act of
Congress.”); U.S. ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 48 (1888) (“The court will
not interfere by mandamus with the executive officers of the government in the
exercise of their ordinary official duties, even where those duties require an interpretation of the law, the court having no appellate power for that purpose”);
Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840) (“[J]udgment upon the
construction of a law must be given in a case in which [heads of departments]
have jurisdiction, and in which it is their duty to interpret the act of Congress,
in order to ascertain the rights of the parties in the cause before them. The
Court could not entertain an appeal from the decision of one of the Secretaries,
nor revise his judgment in any case where the law authorized him to exercise
discretion, or judgment. Nor can it by mandamus, act directly upon the officer,
and guide and control his judgment or discretion in the matters committed to
his care, in the ordinary discharge of his official duties.”); Edwards’ Lessee v.
Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827) (“In the construction of a doubtful
and ambiguous law, the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect,
is entitled to very great respect.”). For an illuminating discussion of the evolution of doctrines of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation since
the nineteenth century, see generally Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L. J. 908 (2017). Bamzai argues
that Chevron is a departure from nineteenth-century standards, and from the
APA, because it conflates and combines the respect due to contemporaneous official interpretations, and deference under the extraordinary writs, into a general presumption that administrative interpretations of statutory ambiguities
deserve judicial deference. The merits of that historical argument are beyond
the scope of this paper. My only point in this Section is that prior to Chevron, in
a variety of contexts, courts considered the agency’s construction of a statute to
have considerable authority, and would not invariably interpret the statute de
novo.
43. 95 U.S. 760 (1877) (upholding the Secretary of the Navy’s interpretation
of statutory provisions fixing annual salaries for assistant-surgeons).
44. Id. at 763.
45. Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933) (“[A]dministrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will
not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the scope of the command is
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Judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation took
on renewed prominence as the New Deal ushered in a rapid expansion of national administrative capacities.46 The courts began to distinguish cases where Congress had allocated primary
interpretive authority to the agency, rather than the judiciary,
to resolve the meaning of a statutory term with significant policy
implications. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 47 the Court
recognized a zone of interpretive discretion in which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) definition of “employee”
was to be accepted by the Court if it had “a warrant in the record
and a reasonable basis in law.” 48 While acknowledging that
“questions of statutory interpretation . . . are for the courts to
resolve,” 49 the Hearst Court nonetheless recognized that agency
interpretations might, and sometimes must, inform judicial interpretation. The authority a court would accord to the agency’s
position would depend on the scope of policymaking authority
Congress had dedicated to the agency and the degree to which
the agency demonstrated its expert judgment in its construction
of the statute. 50
This flexible regime of deference was crucial to many of the
canonical cases of judicial statutory interpretation during and
after the New Deal, such as United States v. American Trucking
Ass’n 51 and Griggs v. Duke Power. 52 Such cases recognized that
the delegation of implementing authority to an agency usually
entailed the delegation of policymaking discretion, since the
indefinite and doubtful. . . . The practice has peculiar weight when it involves a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently
and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”).
46. See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the
Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 430–38
(2007).
47. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
48. Id. at 131 (internal quotations omitted).
49. Id. at 130–31.
50. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944); see also Peter L.
Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (distinguishing the
“weight” courts may give to agency views in determining the boundaries of the
agency’s interpretative discretion from the “space” in which Congress has allocated primary authority to the agency).
51. 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (deferring to the opinion of the Wage & Hour
Division of the Department of Labor).
52. 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (deferring to interpretation by the EEOC).
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statute would inevitably leave some of its goals underdetermined. As the Court observed in Morton v. Ruiz, “[t]he power of
an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress.” 53
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,54 the Court temporarily
simplified this nuanced regime with its famous two-step procedure. Generalizing the approach first developed in Hearst,55
Chevron held that if a statutory provision is ambiguous, the
courts should generally infer that the legislature has delegated
the interpretive choice to the administering agency by implication.56 In such cases, courts should defer to the interpretation of
the administering agency if it is “permissible” or “reasonable.” 57
The scope of Chevron, however, was not entirely clear.58 Did it
refer to any agency interpretation, no matter the procedural
form, or did it apply only to legislative rules issued through notice-and-comment procedures? Did courts still have the responsibility to determine independently any possible interpretations
of ambiguous language as a threshold inquiry? 59 Uncertainty
and disagreement concerning Chevron’s realm of application
eventually led the Court to specify the forms of agency action to
which it applied. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca 60 and INS v. AguirreAguirre 61 together hold that Chevron applies to interpretations
reached in the course of binding adjudications, as well as those
promulgated through rulemaking. 62 Christensen v. Harris

53. 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
54. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
55. See Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789,
792 (arguing that Chevron “universalized Hearst [by] creat[ing] a presumption
that to the extent any statute conferring authority for its administration on a
particular agency lacked a fixed meaning[,] . . . [t]he uncertainties were to be
regarded as delegations to those agencies of a responsibility reasonably to
choose among the possibilities the statutory language offered”).
56. 467 U.S. at 842–43.
57. Id. at 843.
58. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 835 (2001).
59. See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps,
95 VA. L. REV. 611, 612 (2009).
60. 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987).
61. 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999).
62. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448; Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424.
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County 63 and United States v. Mead Corp. 64 indicate that Chevron does not, however, ordinarily extend to documents that are
not issued in the exercise of the agency’s delegated lawmaking
authority. Where Chevron does not apply, courts will nonetheless usually accord “some deference” 65 to the agency’s interpretation, depending on the “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 66
There are several other wrinkles to the Court’s current
framework for agency deference, which is better understood as a
“continuum of deference,” rather than as a set of hard-and-fast
rules. 67 Here, I want to focus on one particularly salient and theoretically interesting exception—the major questions exception—to the general principle that at least some level of deference is owed to an agency’s interpretations of the statute it
administers.
B. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CASES: FROM KEEPING ELEPHANTS
OUT OF MOUSEHOLES TO KEEPING ELEPHANTS OUT OF THE
SAVANNA
In a series of cases, the Court has declined to defer to agencies’ statutory interpretations where it considers the interpretive question to be one of “economic and political magnitude.” 68
In these cases, the Court presumes that Congress does not impliedly delegate to agencies the authority to resolve particularly
important matters. This principle has gradually expanded over
the course of the cases where it has been deployed—from a caution against reading broad powers into narrow language into a
general presumption that important questions are simply inappropriate for agency resolution.

63. 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
64. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
65. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).
66. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
67. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from
Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008).
68. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
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1. Supreme Court Adoption, Application, and Expansion of the
Major Questions Doctrine
The major questions doctrine first emerged as a distinguishable technique of statutory interpretation in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co. 69 In that case, the Court rejected the
Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) interpretation of
the filing requirements of the Communications Act of 1934. 70
The FCC had issued a rule that interpreted its authority to modify 71 tariff filing requirements to permit it to waive such requirements altogether for certain carriers. 72 The late Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, first found that the Commissions’s statutory authority to “modify” the requirements did not encompass
the authority to make a “radical or fundamental change.” 73 This
was presented as an ordinary textual argument, relying on dictionary definitions of “modify,” rather than the importance of the
interpretive question. 74 He then concluded that the broad filing
waiver was indeed a radical change, and thus exceeded the
bounds of the FCC’s interpretive discretion. In the Court’s view,
the waiver was “a fundamental revision of the statute,” rather
than an incremental adjustment, since it withdrew the Act’s crucial filing requirements from “40% of a major sector of the industry.” 75 If these premises are valid, this argument resolves the
question decisively against the agency. If “modify” connotes a
limited administrative authority, then an agency cannot make a
major change in reliance upon that statutory term. As Justice
Scalia memorably stated in a later case, “Congress . . . does not
. . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”76
But Justice Scalia at one point announces a broader principle, not necessary to the holding: “It is highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will
be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that it would achieve that
69. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
70. Id. at 234.
71. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2012).
72. In re Tariff Filing Requirements for Interstate Common Carriers, 7
FCC Rcd. 8072, 8075 (Nov. 25, 1992).
73. MCI, 512 U.S. at 229.
74. Id. at 225–29.
75. Id. at 231.
76. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citing
MCI, 512 U.S. at 231; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 159–60 (2000)).
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through such a subtle device as permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing
requirements.” 77 This dictum inaugurates the major questions
doctrine. Here, Scalia did not merely suggest that the FCC’s major change in filing requirements was an impermissible expansion of the plain meaning of modify. Rather, he presumed that
Congress would not in any event authorize an administrative
agency to make decisions of major economic import without an
express delegation of such authority.
This presumption became central to the holding in FDA v.
Brown & Williamson.78 In that case, the Court declined to grant
Chevron deference to a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
rule interpreting the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to
permit it to regulate nicotine, cigarettes, and smokeless tobacco.79 Specifically, the FDA maintained that nicotine could be
regulated as a “drug,” defined as an “article[] (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body,” 80
and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco could each be regulated as a “device,” meaning, in relevant part, “an instrument,
apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance . . . intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.” 81 The Court rejected the FDA’s interpretation.82 Though the it might ordinarily
defer to the FDA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutory definition of drug and device, 83 the Court reasoned:
This is hardly an ordinary case. Contrary to its representations to Congress since 1914, the FDA has now asserted jurisdiction to regulate an
industry constituting of a significant portion of the American economy. . . . [W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an
agency in so cryptic a fashion. 84

77. MCI, 512 U.S. at 231.
78. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61.
79. Id. at 160.
80. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2012);
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127.
81. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127.
82. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
83. See Jody Freedman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 73; see also Theodore W. Ruger, The
Story of FDA v. Brown & Williamson: The Norm of Agency Continuity, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 335, 358–59 (William N. Eskridge Jr. et al.
eds., 2011).
84. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60.
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Relying on MCI, the Court established a presumption against
Chevron-style implied delegation where a major question was
concerned. 85
In fact, however, the Court had significantly expanded the
holding of MCI. In the latter case, the Court had found that the
plain meaning of the term “modify” indicated that the FCC could
not make a major amendment to the regulatory scheme under
that provision. In Brown & Williamson, by contrast, the terms
“drug” and “device” plainly comprehend nicotine and cigarettes,
respectively, as a matter of English usage. The doctrine therefore morphs in Brown & Williamson into a general presumption
against implied delegation, where the Court independently determines that the issue is simply too significant to be left to the
agency. Above and beyond the traditional tools of statutory construction, the major questions doctrine therefore provides additional grounds for delimiting the scope of agency authority. 86
Where the Court concludes that the agency has made an important policy decision with far-reaching consequences under
ambiguous legislative authority, the Court will not defer, but rather, take on the interpretive task itself.
Two subsequent cases confirmed that the major questions
doctrine was not a fleeting aberration, but a persistent—if sparingly invoked—element of the Court’s deference regime. In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,87 the Court again invoked the
85. Id. at 160.
86. In Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor offers three separate arguments to conclude that Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue,
and thus Chevron deference was unwarranted: (1) she first combines a “whole
act” argument—the FDA would have to ban cigarettes from the market if it
regulated them as a device—with a “whole code” argument—other statutes
evince Congress’s intent to regulate cigarettes rather than to ban them—to argue that Congress could not have intended for the FDA to regulate cigarettes,
id. at 133–43; (2) she then argues that Congress had “acted against the backdrop of ” and thus “ratified” the Agency’s previous position that it did not have
authority to regulate nicotine or cigarettes when it enacted other statutes regulating tobacco, id. at 144; and (3) she finally argues, separately, that the economic and political significance of regulating cigarettes indicates that Congress
did not delegate this regulatory choice to the agency, id. at 159–61. The major
questions argument is thus one of three independent strands that together support the Court’s conclusion that Congress did not impliedly delegate interpretative discretion to the agency with regards to cigarettes. Though the major questions issue is just one prong of the Chevron step one analysis here, it is
analytically distinct, and was thus positioned to stand on its own as grounds to
withhold deference from an implementing agency.
87. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
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major questions doctrine to support its conclusion that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) greenhouse-gas emissions
standards and permitting requirements for motor vehicles impermissibly interpreted the Clean Air Act.88 Citing MCI and
Brown & Williamson, Justice Scalia reasoned that the “EPA’s
interpretation is . . . unreasonable because it would bring about
an enormous and transformative expansion in [the] EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. . . .
We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” 89
In Gonzales v. Oregon,90 decided eight years earlier, the
Court had applied the major questions doctrine somewhat differently. In that case, the doctrine helped to determine the amount
of weight owed to the Attorney General’s interpretive rule that
constructed the registration provisions of the Controlled Substances Act to prohibit the prescription of certain drugs used in
physician-assisted suicide. 91 Citing Brown & Williamson, the
Court reasoned that the interpretive rule did not fall under the
Chevron framework, because Congress would not have delegated
authority over an issue of such political significance through the
statute’s registration provisions. 92 It explained: “The importance
of the issue of physician-assisted suicide, which has been the
subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’ across the country
. . . makes the oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more
suspect.” 93 Instead, the Court treated the interpretive rule as a
nonbinding document, which would be accorded weight only to
the extent that it had “power to persuade.” 94 Because the Attorney General lacked any medical expertise relevant to the regulation of physician-assisted suicide, and because of the “apparent
absence of any consultation with anyone . . . who might aid in a
reasoned judgment,” the Court considered the rule’s persuasive
force to be nil. 95

88. Id. at 2444–45.
89. Id. at 2444.
90. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
91. Id. at 250–54.
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id. at 267–68 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735
(2006)).
94. Id. at 268.
95. Id. at 269.
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The major questions doctrine was applied and expanded by
the Supreme Court in King v. Burwell. 96 There, the Court denied
deference to the IRS interpretation of a key provision of the Affordable Care Act.97 The IRS had interpreted “Exchange established by the State” 98 to include exchanges established by the
federal government, so that healthcare tax credits could be provided through such latter exchanges.99 The Court, citing language from Brown & Williamson, declined to defer to the
agency’s interpretation of the admittedly ambiguous provision:
The tax credits are among the Act’s key reforms, involving billions of
dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. 100

The Court then went on to offer its own construction of the Act
without any regard to the IRS’s interpretation. Analyzing the
overall statutory structure and Congress’s “legislative plan,” it
concluded independently that the provision did, in fact, mean
what the IRS had thought it meant. 101
Note that in King, there is a subtle yet significant expansion
in the application of the major questions doctrine from Brown &
Williamson: the IRS’s interpretation was not a departure from
its previous position, as had been the case in the FDA’s decision
to regulate tobacco products. In characterizing the FDA’s decision to regulate tobacco products as an “extraordinary case[]”
that did not merit Chevron deference, Justice O’Connor emphasized that the FDA’s current claims were “[c]ontrary to its representations to Congress since 1914.” 102 The fact that the agency
had reversed a longstanding position made the Agency’s assertion of “jurisdiction to regulate . . . a significant portion of the
American economy” particularly suspect. 103 In King, by contrast,
the major questions doctrine was invoked to decline deference to
96. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
97. Id. at 2488–89.
98. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)–(c) (2012).
99. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378
(May 23, 2012) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602).
100. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89 (citing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)).
101. Id. at 2496.
102. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
103. Id. at 123.
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the “contemporaneous construction” of a recently enacted statute by an agency charged with administering it—a case where
great deference would ordinarily be particularly appropriate. 104
The Court nonetheless asserted its interpretive prerogative,
wresting power away from the agency, only to conclude that the
agency had been right all along. The disagreement was structural—who decides?—rather than substantive—what is the answer?
2. Circuit Court Interpretation and Expansion of the Major
Questions Doctrine
Another high-profile use of the major questions doctrine
came in Texas v. United States, where the Fifth Circuit upheld
the district court’s nationwide injunction on DAPA. 105 The DAPA
program set out general criteria for Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) immigration-enforcement officials to consider in
deferring removal proceedings for undocumented immigrants
and in conferring a status of “lawful[] presen[ce]” that would enable recipients to apply for employment eligibility and social security benefits. 106 In concluding that Texas was likely to succeed
on the merits of its challenge to DAPA under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), the court concluded that, aside from its
procedural deficiencies, the policy was substantively beyond the
delegated immigration enforcement authority of the Department. 107 The court relied on the major questions doctrine to reject DHS’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), reasoning that:
DAPA would make 4.3 million otherwise removable aliens eligible for
lawful presence, employment authorization, and associated benefits
. . . . DAPA undoubtedly implicates “question[s] of ‘deep economic and
political significance’ that [are] central to this statutory scheme; had
Congress wished to assign that decision to an agency, it surely would
have done so expressly.” 108

104. See Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315
(1933); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 252 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986).
105. 809 F.3d. 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
106. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., for León Rodríguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Serv., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf.
107. Texas, 809 F.3d. at 186.
108. Id. at 181.
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Despite admittedly “broad grants of authority” 109 to the Secretary of DHS to “establish[] national immigration enforcement
policies and priorities,” 110 the court concluded that the INA could
not be construed to grant such policymaking discretion to
DHS. 111
In this judgment, the major questions doctrine takes on its
full potential breadth. Despite explicit statutory terms granting
enforcement policy discretion, the court concluded that Congress
simply could not have meant to vest the Secretary of DHS with
authority to make such a major change in immigration policy.
One might therefore say that, in its most extreme form, the major questions doctrine not only aims to keep administrative elephants from emerging out of statutory mouseholes, but also aims
to take elephants out of the savanna of administrative policymaking altogether. Even when Congress explicitly grants broad
policymaking discretion to agencies, the major questions doctrine may deny deference to interpretations that seem, by the
court’s judgment, to be politically portentous. This incarnation
of the major questions doctrine remains in force, though without
the benefit of a Supreme Court opinion grappling with its reasoning. The Court granted certiorari in Texas v. United States,
but ultimately affirmed the judgment by an equally divided
Court. 112
Another in-depth discussion of the major questions doctrine
came in U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, in which the D.C. Circuit
denied rehearing en banc of an unsuccessful challenge to the
FCC’s Open Internet Order.113 The Order imposed common-carrier regulations on Internet service providers in the interest of

109. Id. at 183.
110. 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012).
111. The Fifth Circuit went on to use the major questions doctrine to find
the DHS interpretation unreasonable under Chevron step two. Assuming arguendo that the Department’s interpretation of the INA was not barred at Chevron step one, the court found that the interpretation was impermissible at Chevron step two, because it was “an unreasonable interpretation that is ‘manifestly
contrary’” to the Act. Texas, 809 F.3d. at 182. It found that the grant of enforcement policy discretion to the Secretary could not “reasonably be construed as
assigning ‘decisions of vast economic and political significance,’ such as DAPA,
to an agency.” Id. at 183.
112. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
113. 855 F.3d. 674, 382 (2017).
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ensuring open and nondiscriminatory public access to the Internet. 114 The FCC relied on its statutory authority to regulate telecommunications services as common carriers. 115 In his dissent
from the denial, Judge Kavanaugh argued that: “The FCC’s net
neutrality rule is a major rule, but Congress has not clearly authorized the FCC to issue the rule. For that reason alone, the
rule is unlawful.” 116 The concurrence in the denial from Judges
Srinivasan and Tatel emphasized that the Supreme Court had
already recognized that the meaning of telecommunications service was ambiguous, and that it was therefore left to the FCC’s
discretion whether to classify Internet service providers as
such. 117 But, in Judge Kavanaugh’s view, the net-neutrality rule,
as a major rule, required an express congressional delegation of
authority, and could not be supported by ambiguity in the statutory text. 118 As he admits, the conclusion that a rule is major
“has a bit of a ‘know it when you see it’ quality.” 119 Such an openended judgment call could doom agency action in the absence of
a crystal-clear statutory mandate.
II. RECONSTRUCTING THE RATIONALE FOR THE
MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE: FROM
NONDELEGATION TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
Why should courts presume that Congress does not delegate
interpretative authority to agencies on major issues? Bracketing
the question of how precisely we are to distinguish questions
that are major from those that are minor or interstitial, why
should we suppose that Congress would not assign such issues
of economic and political magnitude to the judgment of administering agencies? Scholars have offered, and in some cases endorsed, several different rationales for the doctrine, including

114. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738 (Apr.
13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8 & 20).
115. 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2012).
116. U.S. Telecom, 855 F.3d. at 418 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 383 (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Serv. v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)).
118. Id. at 423 (Kavanaugh J., dissenting).
119. Id.
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combatting agency aggrandizement; 120 supporting the under-enforced constitutional principle of nondelegation;121 enforcing legislative supremacy;122 and avoiding administrative interference
with public deliberation.123 In this Part, I will argue that the major questions doctrine is an interpretive presumption that buttresses the under-enforced constitutional norm of popular sovereignty. The principles of nondelegation, legislative supremacy,
and deliberation-inducement that have been put forward in defense of the doctrine each protect democratic legitimacy at different levels of institutionalization—the people’s allocation of
constitutional power; the special status of Congress as a democratically accountable institution; and the protection of the ongoing process of political discourse that tethers governmental action to public opinion. This democracy-reinforcing vision
supposes that major value choices must be made in a transparent, accountable, inclusive, and deliberative fashion.
In Section A, I show that the major questions doctrine is a
statutory presumption that reinforces the constitutional norm of
nondelegation. In Section B, I relate the nondelegation doctrine
to a deeper democratic norm: that fundamental questions of
principle and policy must be settled in a deliberative process that
includes members of the affected public.

120. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest,
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’ Y 203, 261 (2004); Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil,
Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1015–16
(1999); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 58, at 844–45.
121. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 224–27; Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding
Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 26–33 (2010).
122. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies
to Interpret Statutes, 2013 WISC. L. REV. 411, 436 (“When an agency such as the
FDA makes a major policy move on its own, without sufficient mooring in a
congressional authorization, it undercuts the democratic legitimacy of statutes.”); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions” Exception to
Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why Massachusetts v.
EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 631 (2008).
123. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 287–89 (2010); see also Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 764
(2007) (“[T]he Court withheld deference because the respective administrations—agency heads, key White House officials, or even the President himself—
although electorally accountable, had interpreted broad delegations in ways
that were undemocratic when viewed in the larger legal and social contexts.”).
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A. THE DOCTRINAL STATUS OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS RULE:
REINFORCING NONDELEGATION THROUGH STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court turned to
substantive canons of statutory interpretation as a means of enforcing its conception of constitutional values. 124 Substantive
canons, such as the requirement that Congress must make its
intention absolutely clear if it wishes to alter the balance of state
and federal powers, 125 allow the courts to police constitutional
structural norms without taking the aggressive step of striking
down unconstitutional legislation.126 Such substantive canons
encompassed administrative interpretations of statutes, such as
when the Court rejected the NLRB’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over certain religious schools in order to avoid conflict
between the National Labor Relations Act and the First Amendment. 127
Amongst the constitutional values the Court sought to protect with its substantive canons was the nondelegation doctrine.
In Mistretta v. United States, where the Court upheld Congress’s
delegation of authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines to a
judicial commission, the Court noted that “[i]n recent years, our
application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been
limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations
that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.” 128 The
Court cited Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute (The Benzene Case), where it had rejected the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration’s (OSHA) benzene exposure standards, in part, for failure to quantify adequately the carcinogenic risk posed by benzene. 129 In that case,

124. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
275–308 (1994).
125. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991); Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
126. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 712–
48 (5th ed. 2014) (discussing and critiquing constitutional avoidance canons and
clear statement rules).
127. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 506 (1979).
128. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).
129. Id.
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Justice Stevens reasoned in his plurality opinion, “[i]n the absence of a clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume
that Congress intended to give the Secretary the unprecedented
power over American industry that would result from the Government’s view.” 130 Stevens went on to reason that if OSHA were
correct that the Act did not compel a quantification of the risk
posed by benzene,
the statute would make such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative
power ’ that it might be unconstitutional under the Court’s reasoning
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan. A construction of the statute that avoids this kind of
open-ended grant should certainly be favored. 131

The Benzene Case provides the clearest precedent for the
major questions doctrine, 132 and links it definitively to the nondelegation doctrine. In Utility Air Regulatory Group, 133 Justice
Scalia cites the plurality opinion in The Benzene Case for the
proposition that “[w]e expect Congress to speak clearly if it
wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” 134 This language suggests that the major
questions doctrine is a clear statement rule which reinforces the
nondelegation doctrine. 135
By presuming that Congress does not intend administrative
agencies to settle major questions, the Court construes statutes
so as to avoid the impermissible delegation of legislative power
that might occur if the agency could resolve important questions
of principle and policy. Since the primary purpose of the major
questions doctrine is to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine in
130. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645
(1980).
131. Id. at 656 (internal citations omitted).
132. I do not include The Benzene Case amongst the major questions cases
described in Part I.A.1, supra, because it predates Chevron, and therefore does
not analyze issues of statutory ambiguity in the way that all the other major
questions cases do—using the doctrine to undercut the Chevron presumption
that any statutory ambiguity should be construed as granting a degree of deference or weight to the administering agency’s interpretation. On the disjunction
between the approach in The Benzene Case and Chevron, see Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of
Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 311 (1988) (“If the Supreme Court
had adopted the Chevron test before it decided Benzene . . . the Court probably
would have resolved [the] case with a single unanimous opinion.”).
133. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
134. Id. at 2444.
135. Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933,
1946 (2017).
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this way, the justification for the major questions doctrine must
be sought out in the nondelegation doctrine itself.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
NONDELEGATION AND MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINES:
DEMOCRACY-REINFORCEMENT
The nondelegation doctrine rests on democratic-constitutional foundations. At the deepest level, the nondelegation doctrine respects the people’s allocation of constitutional power
amongst the branches of government. The Constitution provides,
“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” 136 The nondelegation doctrine aims
to preserve these constitutionally vested jurisdictional rights of
Congress. The “constitutional rights” 137 of Congress are ultimately rooted in “the public rights” 138 of the people, who are “the
only legitimate fountain of power.” 139 The authority of the people
to distribute power is preserved by holding Congress to certain
standards of clarity with regards to its legislative product. Congress must “lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle,”
by which the courts, Congress, and the people can determine the
legality of administrative action. 140
But the nondelegation doctrine does not merely aim to support the people’s fundamental constitutional decision to vest legislative power in one particular body rather than another. Rather, legislation itself is thought to have special democratic
credentials. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in
The Benzene Case, “[The nondelegation doctrine] ensures to the
extent consistent with orderly governmental administration
that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
will.” 141 Congress’s “electoral connection” to the public, 142 and its
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
138. Id.
139. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
140. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
141. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
142. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (discussing how congressmen connect to the public and seek to get
reelected).
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special investigative and deliberative competencies,143 are
thought to make it the preeminent voice of the people as a whole.
This link between congressional legislation and democratic legitimacy has been widely asserted across ideological and theoretical lines in American jurisprudence.144
Such a legislative conception of democracy leads to the conclusion that democracy can be preserved only if Congress makes
basic value choices in the people’s name. 145 As James Willard
Hurst argues, “A statute embodies a choice of values carrying
obligations on those within its governance, backed by the force
of the state.” 146 By making the basic value choices that will guide
policy, Congress retains normative authority over regulatory activity.
The major questions doctrine aims to protect this legislative
jurisdiction over the choice of political values. It does so by assuming Congress does not leave important value choices to agencies. Justice Breyer has articulated this position most clearly.
Justice Breyer arguably invented the major questions doctrine
in 1986, when he claimed that “Congress is more likely to have

143. See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE OR(1991) (arguing that the committee system enables Congress to develop specialized knowledge about policy problems); see also JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994) (arguing that Congress often acts as a deliberative body).
144. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 99 (2005) (“Legislation in delegated democracy is meant to embody the people’s will . . . . [A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator ’s will helps to implement the public’s will and is therefore
consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”); FELIX FRANKFURTER,
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES 16 (1947) (stating that Congress is “the primary law-making agency in a democracy”); ANTONIN SCALIA &
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 397
(2012) (“‘The sovereign will is made known to us by legislative enactment.’ And
it is made known in no other way.” (quoting Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
55, 78 (1850) (McLean, J.))); John F. Manning, The Supreme Court 2013 Term—
Forward: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014)
(stating that Congress is the people’s “most immediate agent”).
145. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985) (referring to “the extraordinary ‘magnitude’ of the
value choices made by Congress in enacting the Sherman Act”) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (“A value
choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence,
and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress . . . .”).
146. JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 40 (1982).
GANIZATION
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focused upon, and answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration.” 147 Breyer has most recently justified
the doctrine on explicitly democratic grounds. He argues that the
way to avoid “conflict between democracy and administration” is
to ensure that administration simply “complements” democracy
“by implementing legislatively determined general policy objectives.” 148 In order to determine the scope of the authority left to
administrative discretion, Breyer would have us consult the
standpoint of the “reasonable member of Congress.” 149 Breyer
asserts that such a reasonable legislator would not have wanted
courts to defer to agencies on questions of “national importance”
or “major importance.” 150 This is a generic presumption that is
not based in particular legislative text, purpose, or history. Its
connection to any specific legislative intent is therefore tenuous.151 It is rather a presumption that aims to reinforce democratic decision-making by increasing the costs to Congress of impliedly delegating significant policy questions to agencies—it
must do so expressly, if at all.
The doctrine also purports to safeguard the broader process
of informed and inclusive political discourse that underlies and
legitimates lawmaking. Abigail Moncrieff argues that MCI and
Brown & Williamson are best explained by the fact that the
agency action in each case interrupted ongoing congressional deliberations over the topic at issue. 152 Lisa Bressman likewise argues that in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales, the administrative agencies in question had undermined democratic
147. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 AD363, 370 (1986). This passage was quoted in full by Justice O’Connor in her opinion for the Court in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
148. Breyer, supra note 144, at 103.
149. Id. at 106–08.
150. Id. at 107.
151. Gluck & Schultz Bressman, supra note 5, find that over sixty percent of
surveyed congressional staffers who draft legislation do not intend the agency
to resolve major questions. Id. at 1003. But over thirty percent of respondents
disagreed. Id. The respondents also noted that, even if they believed Congress
had an “obligation” to address major questions, it sometimes fails to do so because legislators cannot reach an agreement on such issues. Id. at 1004. Moreover, these data do not tell us what elected representatives themselves intend,
much less what Congress as a whole intends, if anything, with regards to a particular piece of legislation.
152. Moncrieff, supra note 122, at 621–32.
MIN. L. REV.
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accountability by acting contrary to legislative preferences and
short-circuiting public debate: “The Court’s decisions demonstrate that no administration is entitled to disregard Congress’s
likely preferences or fence out popular consideration of contested
issues, no matter the reason.” 153 In a similar vein, William
Eskridge argues that legislation has special democratic legitimacy because “[t]he imprimatur of three differently constituted
electorates guarantees a variety of democratic inputs into national policy decisions.” 154 According to Eskridge, it is not merely
the democratic credentials of Congress itself, but also the wider
deliberations that go on between the public and the political
branches of government in the run-up to enactment, that give
statutes their special claim to bind. 155
The argument thus far has reconstructed the rationale behind the major questions doctrine as one of democracy-reinforcement. Interpreted in its best light, the doctrine aims to protect
and to strengthen the connection between the people and governmental action by presuming that a popular and deliberative
process settles major questions of policy. This democratic principle has constitutional, institutional, and discursive dimensions:
the people’s constitutional choice to vest legislative power primarily in Congress must be preserved; Congress’s special institutional competencies to represent electoral constituencies and
investigate social problems must be respected; and the People’s
ongoing engagement with the government in the form of public
debate and interbranch dialogue must be fostered. To this extent, the major questions doctrine rests on sound principles of
democratic constitutionalism. Note, however, that the principle
of democracy-reinforcement does not explain one crucial premise
of the major questions doctrine: that if legislation has left an ambiguity with respect to a major question, democratic accountability will be better served if a court, rather than the administering agency, resolves that ambiguity. In the next Part, I will
explore and critique the reasons for this assumption.

153. Schultz Bressman, supra note 123, at 780 (footnote omitted).
154. Eskridge, supra note 122, at 436.
155. See id., at 423.
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III. WEBERIAN AND COURT-CENTRIC ASSUMPTIONS
UNDERLYING THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
The major questions doctrine supposes that courts are the
primary interpreters of statutory values and that administrative
agencies should be limited to technocratic tasks. 156 These assumptions may have a sort of common-sense appeal for legal
practitioners and scholars. But they are far from self-evident.
Instead, as I will show in this Part, they are rooted in a particular and contestable ideology of the administrative state. Here I
aim to unpack and critique these institutional ideologies that
support the major questions doctrine. In Section A, I will describe the court-centric assumptions that support the major
questions doctrine. In Section B, I will describe its reliance on
Weberian conceptions of administration. In both Sections, I will
suggest that these assumptions are controversial and run the
risk of undermining rather than outlining the conditions of administrative legitimacy.
A. THE LEGAL PROCESS SCHOOL AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In the major questions cases, the court resolves statutory
ambiguities instead of deferring to the agency’s interpretation.
The doctrine therefore rests on the assumption that courts have
superior institutional competence relative to agencies in identifying the important value choices Congress has made. This assumption has its roots in some of the classic thinkers of the Legal
Process School. Lon Fuller, for example, believed that “there is
reason to prefer that form of government which controls moral
attitudes less abstract than mere respect for the will of the state,
and that means, I believe, preeminently government by
judges.” 157 Ronald Dworkin likewise maintained that judges
have the primary responsibility to interpret the basic purposes
expressed in statute, and to identify the principles and policies
those laws embody. 158 He paid scarcely any attention to the role
of agencies in fleshing out statutory meaning, not even considering the possibility that they could resolve questions of principle
156. See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text.
157. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 135 (1940).
158. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–54 (1986) (arguing that
judges should interpret statutes in a way that promotes the integrity of law,
fairness, democratic values, and their own views of justice and policy).
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in the exercise of their discretion. John Hart Ely similarly argued for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine on the grounds
that democratic accountability could only be preserved if Congress retained its responsibility for making the basic normative
decisions in the form of statutory law. 159
The major questions cases are therefore best understood as
a way to reassert the primacy of courts over agencies as the interpretive agents of Congress. As Professor Abbe Gluck has observed, King is only the latest case in which the Court has returned to the confident purposive spirit of the Legal Process
School, and sought to reinvigorate an interpretive partnership
between Congress and the courts in regulatory law: “This Court
seems to want the big questions for itself.” 160
On first blush, this court-centric vision of statutory interpretation seems nonproblematic. Marbury v. Madison, after all, established that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” 161 But recall that
Marbury also drew a distinction between administrative actions
that were “only politically examinable,” and those that were subject to a nondiscretionary statutory duty, and could thus be compelled by a writ of mandamus.162 Administrative law articulates
this distinction between legal obligation and political discretion
in its details. It aims to determine precisely how statutes allocate
interpretive authority between agencies and courts, acknowledging that some questions of statutory interpretation involve political or empirical questions, which executive agencies, rather
than courts, ought to decide in the first instance. 163 Chevron’s
deference regime rests on the premise that “federal judges—who
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do.” 164 It reinforces the separation of

159. ELY, supra note 4, at 132–33.
160. Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 65
(2015).
161. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
162. Id. at 166.
163. See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983) (“[J]udicial review of administrative action contains a question of the allocation of law-making competence in every case . . . .
The court’s interpretational task is . . . to determine the boundaries of delegated
authority.”).
164. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NDRC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984).
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powers by instructing judges not to intrude into political controversies that are the proper province of the legislature and executive, rather than the judiciary.165
The major questions doctrine is controversial because it
wrests interpretive authority away from the agency in precisely
those cases that the court recognizes have “economic and political,” 166 rather than simply legal, significance. It arises when the
statutory meaning is acknowledged to be ambiguous, and thus
any subsequent judicial construction of the statutory requirements must rely upon some policy considerations that are not
purely matters of law. In King, for example, after refusing to defer to the IRS, Chief Justice Roberts was put in the awkward
position of departing from his textualist colleagues to argue that
an “Exchange established by a State” must encompass a federal
exchange, because a contrary reading “could well push a State’s
individual insurance market into a death spiral.” 167 As the late
Justice Scalia observed, this aspect of the Court’s argument necessarily involved policy judgments about the “extrinsic circumstances” in which the law would operate.168 He further noted:
“This Court holds only the judicial power—the power to pronounce the law as Congress has enacted it. We lack the prerogative to repair laws that do not work out in practice . . . .” 169 By
asserting judicial authority to resolve matters of economic and
political significance, the major questions doctrine puts courts,
rather than agencies, in the front-line position of determining
how to make statutory schemes workable. The judiciary, therefore, asserts supremacy over politically-accountable administrative actors in resolving legal questions that must be answered,
at least in part, by consideration of policy.
The question this poses is whether the least democratically
accountable branch of government ought to take on such a political role. The answer depends on how we conceptualize the
proper role of agencies. For if the judiciary does not resolve ambiguities in the legislature’s policy, the executive surely will.

165. See Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 273, 289 (2011).
166. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
167. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2493 (2015).
168. Id. at 2503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819)).
169. Id. at 2505 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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B. THE WEBERIAN ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MAJOR QUESTIONS
DOCTRINE
Alongside the court-centric assumptions of the Legal Process School, the major questions doctrine rests on a normativeinstitutional assumption that administrative agencies have a
purely technical task to perform, and should not answer questions of significant political value. This view is rooted in Max
Weber’s seminal theory of bureaucracy and legal authority. According to Weber, the “bureaucratic administrative staff” is the
“purest type of exercise of legal authority,” because in a system
of perfect bureaucratic hierarchy and accountability, public officials neutrally and efficiently apply the abstract norms of a statute to the facts of particular cases. 170 Bureaucracy is a form of
“domination through knowledge,” which implements the law
through a system of hierarchical command and technocratic
competency.171 Weber argues that bureaucracy is “capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority
over human beings.”172 While regulatory laws might advance
certain “substantive” values, the state bureaucracy would employ a purely “instrumental” or “purposive” conception of rationality (zweckrational), attempting to find the best formal means
to achieve those legislative ends. 173
This descriptive view of bureaucracy led to Weber’s sharp
normative distinction between the vocation of political officials
and the vocation of administrative officials. In a world of moral
and ethical pluralism, the political official had to “take a stand,
to be passionate,” and to assume “exclusive personal responsibility for what he does.” 174 The civil servant, by contrast, should
“execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction.” 175 He would
exhibit “a spirit of formalistic impersonality” in implementing

170. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 220 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968).
171. Id. at 225.
172. Id. at 223.
173. Id. at 26, 226.
174. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 95
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., trans., 1946).
175. Id.
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the law, and thereby attain “the highest degree of efficiency” in
achieving its ends. 176
This view of administration has had lasting influence in political and legal theory. Jürgen Habermas, one of the foremost
proponents of deliberative democratic theory, famously argued
that “there is no administrative production of meaning.” 177 Administration, in his view, is a purely technical enterprise, which
always risks sapping civil society of its reservoirs of cultural
meaning and ethical commitment. 178 Bureaucracy is deeply dangerous to democratic politics, because it proceeds through formal
rules, hierarchies of command, and specialized knowledge, rather than through debate between free and equal citizens. Political discourse is something that takes place exclusively within
the public sphere and in the relationship between the public
sphere and the legislative process. In Between Facts and Norms,
which synthesized American and German constitutional theory,
Habermas argued that “[t]he norms fed into the administration
bind the pursuit of collective goals to pregiven premises and keep
administrative activity within the horizon of purposive rationality.” 179
American legal scholars and jurists also often rely explicitly
upon Weberian premises. As Louis Jaffe noted, the seminal administrative law scholarship of Ernst Freund and James Landis
shared Weberian theories of legislatively authorized, expert administration. 180 Edward Rubin deploys Weber’s theory of bureaucracy to argue that administrative law should focus exclusively on the “instrumental rationality” of administrative action,
rather than on public participation. 181 Jerry Mashaw likewise
adopts Weber’s view that administration is fundamentally a
matter of “exercising power on the basis of knowledge.” 182 Using
176. WEBER, supra note 170, at 223, 225.
177. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 70 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., 1975).
178. Id. at 72.
179. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 192 (William Rehg trans.,
1996).
180. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1183, 1186, 1187 (1973).
181. See Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 159–60 (2003) (considering Weber in
the principle of instrumental rationality).
182. JERRY MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CLAIMS 26, 195 (1983).
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Weber’s phraseology, Mashaw argues that “[a]gency implementing action is an instrumentally rational exercise,” in the sense
that agencies must interpret the goals established by the statute
and then find the best “instruments” to achieve those purposes.183
This conception of bureaucracy is evident in some Supreme
Court cases striking down agency action as arbitrary or capricious under the APA. 184 For example, in State Farm,185 the Court
struck down the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s rescission of a passive restraint rule for failure to draw a
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” 186 In Michigan v. EPA, 187 the Court rejected the EPA’s
decision to regulate pollution from power plants because of its
failure to perform a cost-benefit analysis to assess whether such
regulation was “appropriate and necessary.” 188 In these cases,
reasoned administrative decision-making is equated with Weberian instrumental rationality. The agency’s sole task is to find
the most efficient, cost-effective means to achieve the ends established by statute, weighing technological feasibility as well as
economic effects. 189
As Kevin Stack has demonstrated, this conception of administrative reason as “means-ends rationality” is echoed in the Legal Process School’s purposivist approach to statutory interpretation. 190 The agency’s reasoning process, in this view, must be

183. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative
Law? A Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2007).
184. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
185. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
186. Id. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
187. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
188. Id. at 2706–07 (“Read naturally . . . the phrase ‘appropriate and necessary’ requires at least some attention to cost.”).
189. See, e.g., supra notes 183–88 (summarizing analytical steps agencies
must make when interpreting statutes).
190. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies
Interpret Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 877–79 (2015) (“[T]he purposive account suggests that the basic question of judicial review should be whether the
agency’s action furthers the statute’s purposes within allowable means.”).
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completely confined to achieving the goals provided for in its organic act.191 There is thus a deep affinity between the Legal Process School’s court-centric emphasis,192 and the Weberian conception of administration. If agencies are restricted to purely
instrumental reasoning, rather than value-based consideration
of questions of political significance, they should not be able to
settle any major policy questions left open by statutory ambiguities. 193 This is instead a job for the courts. 194
Weberian conceptions of bureaucracy also provide a powerful basis for diagnosing American administrative agencies’ alleged failure to deal adequately with ethical values. For example, Justice William Brennan relied on Weber’s account of
bureaucracy to defend the due process revolution in Goldberg v.
Kelly 195 as a necessary judicial response to our “bureaucratic
state’s” failure to respond to “[the] human realities at stake” in
administrative action. 196 Professor Gerald Frug indicts “the ideology of bureaucracy” in American administrative law, citing
Weber’s conception of bureaucracy to guide his critique of the
“deceptive” judicial effort to justify illegitimate assertions of
state power.197 Most recently, Jacob Gerson and Jeannie Suk 198
have relied on Weber’s description of bureaucracy to criticize the
Department of Education’s (DOE) interpretation of Title IX, 199
which has imposed extensive reporting requirements and adjudicative procedures on universities to address sexual assault and
harassment.200 Because sex implicates “emotion” and “desire,”
191. Id. at 879.
192. See supra Part III.B.
193. See supra Part III.A.
194. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
195. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
196. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and “ The Progress of Law,”
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 19–20 (1988).
197. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1278, 1297–1305 (1984) (describing the links between
Weber “formal” view of bureaucracy and the nondelegation doctrine as well).
198. See Jacob Gerson & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 881, 884–86 (2016) (“[T]he sex bureaucracy is unfortunately counterproductive to the goal of actually addressing the harms of rape, sexual assault, and
sexual harassment.”).
199. See Title IX of the Education Amendments (Title IX) of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681–1688 (2012) (covering the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sex in educational institutions and enforcement provisions).
200. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School
Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12040, 12044
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they suggest that a Weberian, morally blinkered federal bureaucracy lacks the institutional competency to address these sensitive and ethically charged issues.201 They imply that “there is a
democratic deficit underneath the sex bureaucracy,” because
Congress would not be likely today to pass legislation specifically
endorsing the DOE interpretation of Title IX.202
This Weberian view of bureaucracy is an implicit premise of
the major questions doctrine.203 As Gerson and Suk’s argument
shows, the Weberian view forecloses agencies from making
value-laden decisions. 204 It is presumptively inappropriate for a
bureaucracy to make such policy judgments. 205 If we follow Weber in treating administrative agencies as limited to instrumental rationality, then we must presume that Congress does not
permit agencies to make value choices—much less value choices
concerning matters of “such economic and political significance.” 206 Instead, they must simply find the appropriate means
to achieve the value choices Congress has already endorsed, as
those values have been interpreted by the judiciary. 207
Some of the scholars cited above might be skeptical of the
nondeferential posture of the major questions doctrine, doubting, perhaps, whether there is any justiciable way to distinguish
a major from a minor question of statutory interpretation. 208
(Mar. 13, 1997) (“Procedures adopted by schools will vary considerably in detail,
specificity, and components . . . .”).
201. See Gerson & Suk, supra note 198, at 947 (“What does it mean when an
institution designed to eliminate ‘from official business love, hatred, and all
purely personal, irrational and emotional elements’ regulates ‘[t]he behavior of
a human being in sexual matters, [which] is often a prototype for the whole of
his other modes of reaction to life?’ In part, this is a question about institutional
match. Is the federal bureaucracy the right political institution to be regulating
ordinary sex?”) (quoting Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 215–16 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans.,
1946) and SIGMUND FREUND, SEXUALITY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE 25
(1963)).
202. Id.
203. See supra Part III.B.
204. See Gerson & Suk, supra note 198, at 886.
205. See supra notes 137, 147–48 and accompanying text.
206. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000).
207. Id. at 161 (stating that administrative action “must always be grounded
in a valid grant of authority from Congress”).
208. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 197, at 1301–04 (drawing on principles based
on the nondelegation doctrine, “one of the critical ingredients of policymaking
authority is the ability to decide how much to decide oneself and how much to
let others decide as problems develop”).
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But the incorporation of Weberian motifs in administrative law
scholarship complicates the effort to carve out a space for any
non-trivial value choices within administrative action. Once one
adopts Weber’s description of bureaucracy as an efficient instrument of policies and principles established by the legislature, 209
there are indeed strong reasons to presume that Congress would
not have left such choices to agencies. When our prototype of administration is a hierarchical organization composed of technically sophisticated but perhaps under-socialized experts, it is
very unappealing to suppose that such characters and institutions might resolve and interpret our political commitments, rather than merely find the most technologically feasible and costeffective means to bring them about. The influence of this strand
of Weberian political theory has therefore buttressed a strong
presumption that norm-setting is a matter for legislatures and
courts, but not for agencies. 210
As the critical assessments of Brennan, Frug, and Gerson
and Suk suggest, the broader implications of the Weberian conception of administration are normatively troubling. The Weberian view treats administration as an inherently alienating,
morally-vacant, and purely technocratic aspect of modern governance, which undermines the legitimacy of the regulatory
state. 211 It understands administration as categorically incapable of fulfilling a basic requirement of democratic constitutionalism: that laws and policies must be justified to those they bind
in ways that are genuinely responsive to their dignity, needs,
and interests. 212 If the Weberian diagnosis of bureaucracy is correct, and the Weberian prescriptions for administrative reason
are appropriate, there is little hope that bureaucracy will ever
be capable of satisfying our desire for a form of government that
209. WEBER, supra note 170, at 220–26.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. See JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 43 (1978) (discussing the tendency
of Weberian bureaucracy to “fracture the integrity of the individual and destroy
a society’s sense of community”).
212. See generally RAINER FORST, THE RIGHT TO JUSTIFICATION: ELEMENTS
OF A CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY OF JUSTICE (Jeffrey Flynn trans., Columbia
Univ. Press 2012) (arguing that democracy requires at a minimum that coercive
action be justified to the persons it affects in a way they can understand); JERRY
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 100–01, 172–253
(1986) (arguing for an approach to administrative due process that respects human dignity and liberal-constitutional forms, rather than mere Weberian instrumental rationality).
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is adequately responsive to public feedback, ethical values, or
private autonomy. 213
There is reason to doubt, however, whether the Weberian
account is indeed an accurate account of, or desirable standard
for, the administrative process of the United States. Weber’s vision of a purely technocratic, formally rational administrative
state conflicts with an important feature of our institutional regime—the fact that agencies often do engage in forms of deliberative, rather than instrumental, reasoning.214 Whereas instrumental rationality attempts to find the best means to achieve a
given end, deliberative reason engages multiple actors in filling
out the content of abstract norms to which all parties assent. 215
The discursive aspect of administrative practice has not gone altogether unnoticed by legal scholars. Mark Seidenfeld’s civic republican theory of the administrative state emphasizes that bureaucratic institutions are capable of high-quality deliberation
over how best to pursue the common good. 216 Henry Richardson
likewise argues that, even though agencies must pursue the policies enacted in statutes, this process must be (and sometimes
is) characterized by deliberative, rather than purely instrumental reason, as agencies specify statutory norms in value-oriented
dialogue with the affected public.217 William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn embrace Richardson’s conception of administrative
reason, and explicitly recognize that agencies have a central role

213. See MASHAW, supra note 212, at 252 (In the domain of administrative
due process, “[t]he personal domination of the coercive caseworker has been replaced by general rules susceptible to political control. From a liberal perspective that is an unambiguous gain. But if what was really wanted was individualized attention based on consensus values and freed from the risks of arbitrary
personal domination, the transformation to formalism may seem a hollow victory”).
214. See infra Part IV for an extensive defense of this claim.
215. On the distinction between instrumental and deliberative reason, see 2
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, A THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 301–31 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987) (discussing the “distance between expert cultures and
the broader public” in active civic engagement).
216. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1547–49 (1992) (“ The court should not interfere
with the agency’s use of its expertise and political awareness to reach a decision
[it] truly believes is good policy.”).
217. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 214–30 (2002) (“Ends that are broadly agreed upon
in the legislature will get variously interpreted . . . with different substantive
concerns and different contexts of operation.”).
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to play in deliberation over the public purposes advanced in statutes.218 They make clear that administrative deliberation is not
always simply a matter of finding the best means to implement
a clearly defined norm, but may also involve practical reasoning
over fundamental public values. 219
The major questions doctrine thus rests on a particular and
controversial political theory of our administrative state: the legislature bears primary responsibility for making the value
choices that animate governmental action; and the judiciary
must ensure that the legislature retains that responsibility by
presuming that Congress does not delegate that task to agencies.220 Accounts like that of Richardson’s, and Eskridge and
Ferejohn’s, however, suggest the reemergence of an alternative
theory: one that I argue better comports with our institutions
and the ideological origins of our administrative state. The next
Part explores that theory as the basis for a reformation of the
major questions doctrine.
IV. THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
This Part gives an alternative account of our administrative
process based on the Progressives’ original understanding of the
state they wanted to create. In Section A, I describe the theoretical origins of Progressive political thought. In Section B, I describe the Progressive theory. In Section C, I trace the influence
of the Progressive theory on the welfare and regulatory state
that emerged during the New Deal.
A. THE CONTESTED ORIGINS OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL
THOUGHT: HEGEL AND THE ETHICAL IDEA OF THE STATE
It is widely recognized that the American Progressives were
the founding fathers and mothers of our administrative state. 221
218. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 123, at 77–78 (2010).
219. Id. at 31–32 (describing “administrative constitutionalism” as “the primary means by which governmental actors deliberate about how to respond to
social movement demands or needs,” attending to “higher-level normative considerations,” such as statutory purpose, constitutional rights, and “public
norms”).
220. See supra Part III.B.
221. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO FDR
213–53 (1955) (describing the influence of Progressive thought and politics on
New Deal reforms); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL 21–
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But the original Progressive vision has long been distorted by
legal scholars into a technocratic vision of administrative expertise.222 The time has come to reassess this strand of American
intellectual history. Progressive political thought has begun to
receive renewed attention from scholars aiming to reinvigorate
an administrative state that will reduce social and economic inequality by democratic means. 223 At the same time, conservative
critics of the administrative state routinely link our bureaucratic
government to the philosophy of the American Progressives, and
their adoption of German conceptions of the state. 224 According
to Philip Hamburger, for example, the Progressives introduced
dangerous, Germanic conceptions of the state to American law,
and thus undermined Anglo-American constitutionalism. 225 He
argues that Americans “imbibed” from German civilian legal
51 (1993) (describing the influence of Progressivism on the New Deal); ROBERT
C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (2014) (discussing Progressive conceptions of the democratic public and
administration as a basis for contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence);
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920, at 288 (1982) (“The Progressive state-building sequence has been extended and elaborated over the
course of this century, but the path of institutional development and the terms
of the contest for state control have not been fundamentally altered. . . . The
three great institutional struggles of Franklin Roosevelt’s second term are especially telling in light of the Progressive experience.”).
222. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, On Predicting the Future of Administrative
Law, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. J. GOV’T & SOC’Y, May/June 1982, at 18, 19 (“Progressive doctrine of concentrated power in the hands of technocrats had clearly
become the dominant political theory by the end of [the 1920s] . . . .”); David B.
Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397,
404–05 (2002) (“Progressive scholars combined a cynical view of politics and
politicians with a kind of myopic faith in the ability of ‘scientific’ administration
to cleanse policymaking . . . .”); Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s:
The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1565, 1571 (2011) (describing the Progressive view as holding that “experts
should lead in making policy through modern administrative agencies.”).
223. See, e.g., Rahman, supra note 28, at 1350–51 (drawing on the history of
the Progressive Era to argue that “[r]egulatory agencies, though often understood in technocratic, expertise-oriented terms, might similarly become spaces
for democratic action, participation, and accountability”).
224. See HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at 453; RONALD J. PESTRITTO, WOODROW WILSON AND THE ROOTS OF MODERN LIBERALISM 225–30 (2005) (discussing the Hegelian origins of Woodrow Wilson’s theory of administration); JEAN
M. YARBROUGH, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION
19–24, 44–46 (2012) (discussing Roosevelt’s political thought and Hegel’s theory
of the state).
225. See HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at 447–67 (“German ideas thus paved
the way for the administrative reduction of rights.”).
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theory “an academic idealization of administrative power and a
corresponding contempt for many of the formalities of constitutional law.” 226
Such scholarship misunderstands the Progressive conception of democratic constitutionalism. The Progressives were indeed influenced by German conceptions of administrative power;
but, unlike German state theorists, they sought to make administration democratically responsive. 227 Here, I will briefly summarize the Progressives’ reception of German state theory, and
their democratization of the original German conception. Progressivism, of course, was a vast and complicated political movement, which defies a completely comprehensive account. 228 My
reconstruction will single out a set of authors who together present a coherent and appealing vision that captures much of what
is valuable about our current administrative structures. John
Dewey, Woodrow Wilson, and Frank Goodnow envisioned an administrative state in which political values would be fleshed out
in dialogue between administrators, elected representatives,
and the public at large.229 Administrative agencies would synthesize three sources of public opinion: legislation, presidential
policy preference, and direct involvement by affected parties. 230
It is true that American Progressives were influenced by
German theories of administration. But their inspiration was
not primarily Weber, but rather G.W.F. Hegel. 231 Hegel had
identified, almost a century before Weber, the importance of administrative bodies that were functionally differentiated, hierarchically organized, and staffed by expert officials.232 But unlike

226. Id. at 447.
227. See Blake Emerson, The Democratic Reconstruction of the Hegelian
State in American Progressive Political Thought, 77 REV. POL. 545, 547 (2015)
(stating that the Progressives “envision[ed] a state thoroughly permeated by
public deliberation and participation”).
228. See Daniel T. Rogers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113
(1982) (discussing complexities and contradictions of Progressive movement).
229. See infra Part IV.B.
230. See infra Part IV.B.
231. See Robert D. Miewald, The Origins of Wilson’s Thought: The German
Tradition and the Organic State, in POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: WOODROW
WILSON AND AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 17, 23–26 (Jack Rabin &
James S. Brown eds., 1984).
232. See M. W. Jackson, Bureaucracy in Hegel’s Political Theory, 18 ADMIN.
& SOC. 139, 145–46 (1986) (“By implication, Hegel recognized a hierarchy
within the bureaucracy.”).
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Weber, who understood the state to be a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,” 233 Hegel understood the state as an
embodiment of “concrete freedom.” 234 By this, he meant that the
state institutionalized the Enlightenment ideals of individual
and collective self-determination. 235 This ethical understanding
of the state motivated his conception of administration in particular. Drawing on the experience of liberalizing Prussian social
reform in the early nineteenth century,236 he argued that an administrative state was essential to mitigate poverty, social antagonism, and market failures, in the interests of preserving
public freedom. 237
But Hegel insisted that administration was not merely a
matter of efficient bureaucratic performance. Rather, administration was tasked with “upholding . . . legality and the universal interest of the state,” while resolving conflicts between social
groups by reference to “the higher viewpoints and ordinances of
the state.” 238 To accomplish this task, administrative bodies and
their officials not only needed expertise, but also “direct education in ethics and in thought.” 239
Bureaucratic reason was, for Hegel, a reflective, rather than
purely instrumental, form of reason. That is to say, he supposed
that when administrators interpreted abstract legal norms, they
233. WEBER, supra note 174, at 78.
234. G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 260 (Allen
Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet, trans. 1991).
235. See id. (“ The principle of modern states has enormous strength and
depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to attain fulfilment in the
self-sufficient extreme of personal particularity . . . .”).
236. HEGEL, supra note 234, at x-xi (“In relation to the Prussian state of
1820 [Hegel] represented the tendency toward moderate, liberalizing reform
. . . .”).
237. Id. at §§ 236–45 (describing the inequalities and antagonisms of market-driven “civil society” and the role of law, administration, and regulation in
redressing them). For the political background on Hegel’s political philosophy,
see REINHART KOSELLECK, PREUßEN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND REVOLUTION:
ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG, UND SOZIALE BEWEGUNG VON 1791
BIS 1848, at 263 (3d ed. 1989) (1967) (Ger.) (author ’s translation) (arguing that
Hegel “had not only sketched the picture that the Prussian civil servants had of
themselves, but rather the real situation itself ”); Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff, Hegels
Staatsrecht als Stellungnahme im Ersten Preussischen Verfassungskampf, 35
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHISCHE FORSCHUNG 476, 476 (1981) (Ger.) (author ’s
translation) (interpreting the Philosophy of Right in part as “Hegel’s constitutional plan” during the first constitutional struggle in Prussia in the early
1820s).
238. HEGEL, supra note 234, § 289.
239. Id. at § 296.
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would draw on broader public values and social understandings
to flesh out their concrete content. 240 Hegel’s theory, however,
was not democratic. Though he endorsed representative government within the structure of a constitutional monarchy, he believed public opinion was often misguided and ignorant, and so
sought to guarantee the public welfare by insulating bureaucratic decision-making from its influence. 241 It was in this respect that the American Progressives departed from their German forbearer.
B. THE PROGRESSIVES’ DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The American Progressives embraced Hegel’s idea of an administrative state in which appointed public officials would use
their expertise and ethical judgment to preserve the public interest and control the excesses of private law, commodity exchange, and industrial organization. 242 They thus emphasized
the need for social legislation to authorize the provision of goods
and services and to protect the public against monopoly.243 The
overall thrust of this project was succinctly articulated by John
Dewey and James Tufts:
[I]t is certain that the country has reached a state of development, in
which . . . individual achievements and possibilities require new civic
and political agencies if they are to be maintained as realities. Individualism means inequity, harshness, and retrogression to barbarism . . .
unless it is a generalized individualism: an individualism which takes
into account the real good and effective—not merely formal—freedom
of every social member. 244

Dewey therefore followed Hegel in arguing for administrative institutions that would provide the material and social requisites
for individual freedom on the broadest possible scale.
240. See Carl K. Shaw, Hegel’s Theory of Modern Bureaucracy, 86 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 381, 385 (1992) (arguing that for Hegel, bureaucratic reasoning is “a
dialectical process in which the universal and the particular encounter each
other and become related by means of human deliberation”); see also Robert
Brandom, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual
Norms, 7 EUR. J. PHIL. 164, 172–78 (1999) (arguing that on Hegel’s theory legal
norms develop through their “administration” by acknowledged authorities
within a discursive community of equal persons).
241. HEGEL, supra note 234, §§ 318, 279.
242. See Emerson, supra note 227; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 29, at
447–51.
243. Rahman, supra note 28.
244. JOHN DEWEY & JAMES H. TUFTS, ETHICS 472 (1908).
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Unlike Hegel, however, the Progressives were profoundly
committed to democratic principles. 245 In his seminal 1887 essay
The Study of Administration, which inaugurated the American
field of public administration in 1887, Woodrow Wilson cited Hegel and the Hegelian public law scholar Lorenz von Stein to argue that administration “is raised very far above the dull level of
mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political
wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress.” 246 Wilson
emphasized that when administration tackled such “greater
principles,” it must be guided by public deliberation:
[A]dministration in the United States must be at all points sensitive to
public opinion. . . . The ideal for us is a civil service cultured and selfsufficient enough to act with sense and vigor, and yet so intimately
connected with popular thought, by means of elections and constant
public counsel, as to find arbitrariness or class spirit quite out of the
question. 247

Wilson, like Hegel, thus prized the ideal of a cultured and
independent civil service that would act in the interest of the
people as a whole. But he sought to relativize administrative autonomy to various forms of popular political influence. Electoral
accountability was only one dimension of such influence. A more
pervasive, “constant public council” would ensure that the professional civil service remained in-tune with the concerns of
those they regulated, rather than being motivated their own selfinterest or other inappropriate criteria. This vision of administration carried over into President Wilson’s political vision, as
well as his academic writings. In his presidential campaign, Wilson argued:
[It was the] necessity of the hour to open up all the processes of politics
and of public business,—open them wide to public view; to make them
accessible to every force that moves, every opinion that prevails in the
thought of the people; to give society command of its own economic life
again, not by revolutionary measures, but by a steady application of

245. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2005) (“Progressives . . . mounted a sus-

tained effort to reconstruct the nation’s constitutions, root and branch—not
merely to legitimate the new administrative state, but even more to make lawmakers and policy makers accountable to the people.”).
246. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 199,
210 (1887) (quoting Hegel and Stein, respectively, though the quotation from
Stein is not attributed); see Fritz Sager & Christian Rosser, Weber, Wilson, and
Hegel: Theories of Modern Bureaucracy, 69 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1136 (2009) (outlining the influence of Hegel’s public administration theory on Wilson).
247. Wilson, supra note 246, at 216.
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the principle that the people have a right to look into such matters and
control them . . . . 248

Progressives like Wilson therefore presumed agencies would
implement the laws in ways that touched on great principles of
law and politics, but insisted they do so in dialogue with affected
persons. Dewey similarly stressed that “in the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, . . . the wise cease to be
wise,” because it is impossible for administrative experts “to secure a monopoly of such knowledge as must be used for the regulation of common affairs.” 249 Thus,
[n]o government by experts in which the masses do not have a chance
to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy
managed in the interests of the few. And the enlightenment must proceed in a way which forces the administrative specialist to take account
of the needs. 250

This democratic vision of administration was part and parcel of a reconceptualization of the state itself. Dewey defined the
state as a “public articulated.” 251 The public emerged from externalities caused by economic activity. But without a forum in
which to express its problems, the public was “unorganized and
formless.” 252 In the state, the diffuse public became institutionally embodied and empowered by political institutions. Administrative agencies were then not merely the best technical means
for realizing clearly identified purposes, but were also part and
parcel of the process by which such purposes were identified. 253
This democratic notion of the state gave administrative
agencies a central role to play in the deliberative process, rather
than placing them completely outside of politics as an efficient
instrument for realizing democratic will. 254 Dewey thus argued

248. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE
TION OF THE GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 86 (1913).

EMANCIPA-

249. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 206 (Alan Swallow 1954)
(1927).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 67.
252. Id.
253. Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME 8, 13
(2006) (“Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives
and other state officials. It is cooperative social experimentation.”).
254. MELVIN ROGERS, THE UNDISCOVERED DEWEY: RELIGION, MORALITY,
AND THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY 22 (2009) (“[Dewey holds] a view of the public
sphere that is internally differentiated. This differentiation accounts for the
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on the eve of the New Deal that “The problem of social control of
industry and the use of governmental agencies for constructive
social ends will become the avowed centre of political struggle.” 255 Administrative agencies would not merely be means for
implementing the results of political struggles waged in other
settings, but would provide additional processes in which to
reach provisional settlements over common policy goals.
Legislation had an important but not exclusive role in guiding administrative agencies. The Progressives acknowledged the
special representative competency of Congress, and thus understood the scope of agency action to be framed by legislative enactment. Frank Goodnow, who was also influenced by Hegelian
conceptions of administration, distinguished between legislation
as the expression of democratic will and execution as the deed
which carried out this will.256 He concluded that “popular government requires that it is the executing authority which shall
be subordinated to the expressing authority, since the latter in
the nature of things can be made much more representative of
the people than can the executing authority.”257 As the “body
representative of public opinion,” the legislature had to serve as
“the regulator of administration.” 258
But the Progressives did not believe that administrative action was completely determined by the statutory authority under
which it acted. As Wilson argued, “[t]he scope of Administration
is . . . largely defined and regulated and always limited . . . by
the laws, to which it is of course subject; but serving the State,
not the law-making body in the State, and possessing a life not
resident in statutes.” 259 While agencies were bound by law, they
smooth substantive inclusion of the demands of specific publics into the administrative apparatus of the state, even as it defends publics that emerge in a more
oppositional relationship to state power.”).
255. JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM OLD AND NEW 55–56 (Prometheus Books
1999) (1930).
256. See Christian Rosser, Examining Frank J. Goodnow’s Hegelian Heritage: A Contribution to Understanding Progressive Administrative Theory,
45 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1063 (2012) (discussing the influence of Hegel’s political philosophy on Goodnow’s understanding of administration).
257. FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT 24 (1900).
258. FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 42, 371 (1905).
259. Woodrow Wilson, Notes for Lectures on Administration at the Johns
Hopkins (originally written Jan. 26, 1891; revised Jan. 31–Feb. 1, 1894), in
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served the broader democratic purposes of the state structure as
a whole, which might be expressed in forms other than statutory
enactment. Public participation in the administrative process
provided another source of democratic input into administrative
activity, which would enable administrators to interpret the ambiguous provisions of law by reference to the self-understandings
of the democratic public itself.
Another source of democratic input was the President. The
Progressives were eager to deploy the democratic mandate of the
President to energize and to guide the administrative state they
envisioned. 260 But they did not believe the President should dictate the outcome of administrative proceedings or exercise full
and pervasive control over the administrative apparatus. Goodnow stated:
While . . . in the interest of securing the execution of the state will, politics should have a control over administration, in the interest both of
popular government and efficient administration, that control should
not be permitted to extend beyond the limits necessary in order that
the legitimate purpose of its existence be fulfilled. 261

In Goodnow’s view, the political views of the President and his
appointees legitimately entered into the broad determination of
administrative policy. 262 But complete political control of the administrative apparatus would undermine the impartiality and
efficiency of administrative decision-making. 263
Wilson likewise argued that the President could serve as a
“spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country,
by giving direction to opinion, by giving the country at once the
information and the statements of policy which will enable it to
form its judgments alike of parties and of men.” 264 He would
therefore steer administration by bringing his understanding of
public opinion to bear on administrative activity. But Wilson insisted that, “as legal executive, his constitutional aspect, the
7 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, 1890–1892, at 112, 128–29 (Arthur Link
ed., 1969).
260. See, e.g., Stephen Skowronek, The Conservation Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 2070, 2087 (2009) (“Only the presidency had the national vision to articulate the public’s evolving interests, the political wherewithal to act upon
them with dispatch.”).
261. GOODNOW, supra note 257, at 38.
262. Id. at 91.
263. Id. at 39.
264. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 68 (1908).
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President cannot be thought of alone.” 265 He would delegate to
his cabinet and the agencies substantial authority to specify the
contents of public policy in consultation with affected groups. 266
In this Progressive understanding of the state, judicial review would take a fairly restrained form. 267 Frank Goodnow argued that “efficient administrative action . . . is often impaired
either by the necessity of judicial process or by the extensive judicial control over administrative action.” 268 Acknowledging that
this intensive control had been justified by the “informality of
existing administrative procedure,” he hoped that:
When we develop an administrative procedure which is reasonably regardful of private rights, e.g. gives notice and a hearing to the person
affected by the administrative determination, it may well be that the
courts will change their attitude and come to the conclusion that the
changed and complex conditions of modern life . . . should have an effect both on the constitutional rights of individuals and on the powers
and procedure of administrative authorities. 269

Goodnow therefore believed that internal administrative procedures, rather than external judicial review, could adequately
protect private rights and guarantee conformity with law. This
suggestion dovetailed with Wilson’s and Dewey’s proposals for
administrative proceedings that would bring public opinion to
bear on administrative deliberations. Such procedures would be
both more efficient and more democratic than judicial adjudication. Administrative, rather than judicial, institutions would be
the primary venue for interpreting public purposes left ambiguous by legislative enactment.
C. THE INFLUENCE OF THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY THROUGH
THE NEW DEAL
This democratic theory of administration corresponded to
developments in legal scholarship and administrative practice
during the Progressive Era and through the New Deal. Under
the influence of German conceptions of the state, constitutional
lawyers such as W.W. Willoughby began to conceive of the national government as the ultimate source of law, understanding
265.
266.
267.
268.
(1911).
269.

Id. at 66.
Id. at 76.
KRAMER, supra note 245, at 216.
See FRANK J. GOODNOW, SOCIAL REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 230
Id. at 230–31.
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legislation as the primary expression of the will of the state. 270
In keeping with the Progressives’ revolt against legal formalism,
Roscoe Pound assailed the Lochner Court’s “mechanical jurisprudence,” which had challenged the early development of social
welfare regulation in the United States. 271 Pound embraced instead a Hegelian-inspired “sociological jurisprudence” that
would be responsive to the cultural context, historical development, political purpose, and practical effects of law rather than
categorical conceptions of natural right. 272 All of these developments untethered law from judicial common law and related it
more closely both to the legislature and the popular understandings it was meant to capture.
Administrative practice at the same time began to develop
participatory procedures. Agencies like the Forest Service began
to include the public in the administrative process “to reach out
for the more timid and modest opinions, and for the sifting of the
bolder and more aggressive types.” 273 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) invited industry representatives to comment on
trade practices, which complaints had alleged to be unfair. 274
Progressive administrators under Woodrow Wilson sought to
protect freedom of conscience during World War I through “individualized involvement in the administrative state.” 275
The Progressives’ theory of administration served as the ideological ferment for the New Deal. In 1927, Felix Frankfurter
relied on the “pioneer scholarship” of Goodnow to argue that ad270. See William Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 249, 266–69 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002);
WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, AN EXAMINATION OF THE NATURE OF THE
STATE: A STUDY IN POLITICAL THEORY 302–03 (1911).
271. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908);
see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down state limitations on hours worked as inconsistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Morton G. White, The Revolt Against Formalism in American Social Thought of the Twentieth Century, 8 J. HIST. IDEAS, 131, 132 (1947)
(describing the connection between Dewey’s pragmatism, Oliver Wendell
Holmes’s legal realism, and Hegel’s “evolutionary” conception of rationality).
272. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,
24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911).
273. JOHN PRESTON COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES 199 (1927).
274. GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 79–80 (1924).
275. Jeremy Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1084, 1090–91 (2014).
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ministrative law was of crucial importance to democratic governance and individual liberty. 276 Statutory programs advancing
democratic goals were “conditioned upon rules and regulations
emanating from enforcing authorities.” 277 Recognizing that
broad statutory delegations left important details to the policy
judgment of agencies, he emphasized that these “‘details’ are of
the essence; they give meaning and content to vague contours.” 278 In Frankfurter’s view, the surest protection for democratic constitutionalism in the administrative state would not be
to retain detailed legislative control, but instead to govern administration through a professional civil service, a “spirited bar,”
and “easy access to public scrutiny.” 279 Frankfurter thus presumed that agencies would deal with essential questions of economic and political significance, and sought to ensure democratic control through a combination of bureaucratic
professionalism, adversarial legalism, and public input.
The vast expansion of administrative capacities during the
New Deal would follow in this Progressive tradition. Under the
influence of Dewey’s conception of democratic administration,
agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority 280 and more radical forms of democratic planning in agriculture,281 aimed to involve the affected public in administrative deliberation over
276. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 614, 616 (1927).
277. Id. at 614.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 618. While Frankfurter believed that “the final determinations of
large policy must be made by the direct representatives of the public, and not
by the experts,” his recognition above that the “details” of implementation were
“of the essence,” indicates that he understood important value choices to lie with
agencies, subsidiary to the choice of the “final” or ultimate end by the legislature. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 160 (1930). He
thus insisted that bureaucratic “expertise is indispensable” for the “task of adjusting the conflicting interests of diverse groups in the community, and bending the hostility and suspicion and ignorance engendered by group interests toward a comprehension of mutual understanding.” Id. at 161. “Expertise” of this
kind could not be merely technical, but would include a deliberative capacity to
transform interest group conflict into a joint perception of common interest.
280. DAVID E. LILIENTHAL, TVA—DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 201 (1944)
(quoting Dewey to describe the ideology of participation at the Tennessee Valley
Authority).
281. JESS GILBERT, PLANNING DEMOCRACY: AGRARIAN INTELLECTUALS AND
THE INTENDED NEW DEAL 2 (2015) (describing a “cooperative planning initiative” at the Department of Agriculture, in which “citizens, scientists, and bureaucrats joined together in discussion-based education and action research”).
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planning. 282 New Deal administrative-law scholars like Walter
Gellhorn argued that such Progressive forms of participatory administration served to “democratize our governmental processes,” by giving “the interests and individuals immediately affected an opportunity to shape the course of regulation.” 283 The
APA codified the Progressive innovation of public participation
with its notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions, which required agencies to receive and respond to comments when they
proposed substantive rules. 284
The Progressive theory that lay the foundation for the New
Deal has been obscured because of subsequent political and intellectual developments. In the wake of war with Nazi Germany
and in the midst of the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the
threat of totalitarian government undermined the legitimacy of
administrative government in the United States.285 The Progressive ideal of an administrative state that would act on the basis
of public deliberation was then supplanted with theories of interest-group pluralism, which treated administration as a bargaining process between private interests.286 The subsequent
rise of cost-benefit analysis as a hegemonic framework for policy
reasoning displaced the Progressive notion that the state might
further values other than market efficiency, such as equality and
positive liberty. 287
282. ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 20, 35, 44, 171 (1966) (describing the influence of Dewey and Progressive ideals of democratic planning during the New
Deal).
283. WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 122
(1941).
284. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 4, 60 Stat. 237,
238–39 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012)). For examples of
public participation in agency rulemaking that influenced the APA, see ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT
103–05 (1941).
285. Jeremy K. Kessler, The Political Economy of “Constitutional Political
Economy,” 94 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1546–53 (2016); Reuel E. Schiller, Reining in
the Administrative State: World War II and the Decline of Expert Administration, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD
WAR II 185, 188–90 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002).
286. DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 183–
228 (2006); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (2d ed. 1979) (“American pluralists had no explicit and systematic view of the state. They simply assumed it away.”).
287. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE
ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991) (examining regulatory analysis and its role in the decision-making process).

2072

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2019

We have therefore largely lost sight of the original Progressive intent that animated the project of American state-building.
To be sure, the Progressives’ emphasis on deliberative administrative action persists in civic-republican theories of the administrative state. 288 Like the Progressives, contemporary civic republicans argue that administrative agencies are uniquely
situated to conduct value-oriented policy discourse. 289 But civic
republicanism has not retained the Progressives’ complementary concern with administrative autonomy from judicial control. The Progressives did not merely want to foster public participation in administrative agencies. Participation was a means
to furnish the legal and material requisites for a democratic society. Civic-republican theories often ignore the possibility that
“output legitimacy” can complement the procedural legitimacy
that arises from reasoned public discourse.290
There are trade-offs between these two aspects of Progressivism. Soliciting and responding to public comments in a comprehensive, reasoned fashion takes time and resources that
could otherwise be spent on the delivery of the relevant services.291 As the intensity of judicial review of agency reasoning
increases, so too do these costs.292 For this reason, the Progressive state must balance the need to maximize deliberation
against the need to maximize efficient bureaucratic performance. Civic republicans do not adequately attend to this countervailing concern with bureaucratic autonomy. Cass Sunstein,
for example, has argued for stringent judicial review of administrative action to ensure agencies act rationally and in the public
interests. 293 This approach does not take seriously the costs that
such intensive review incurs for bureaucratic efficiency, nor the
risk that the political inclinations of reviewing courts may im-

288. Seidenfeld, supra note 216.
289. Glen Staszewski, Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy,
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 253–61 (2013).
290. FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 6 (1999) (distinguishing ex ante “input legitimacy,” achieved by involving the public in policy formation, from ex post “output legitimacy,” achieved by
“effectively promot[ing] the common welfare of the constituency in question”).
291. Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1397 (1992).
292. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking,
47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65 (1995).
293. Sunstein, supra note 38, at 61–64, 74–75.
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properly influence or limit the exercise of administrative discretion. The Progressives, by contrast, were wary of judicial overreach, because they believed that courts would unduly constrain
the exercise of public power in order to protect private interests.294
I am suggesting here that we should give this original understanding of the administrative state a second look. The Progressives conceived of agencies as engaging the democratic public in three ways: (1) through the implementation of
democratically enacted law; (2) through the input of the President; and (3) through deliberation with the affected public. 295
They presumed that agencies would tackle ethically charged political questions, but they aimed to ensure that they would do so
in a rational and inclusive fashion. At the same time, they recognized that the extent of public participation would need to be
balanced against the requirements of efficient state action. 296
They were skeptical that the courts were the best forum in which
to ensure the democratic integrity of government, and thus
sought to enhance the democratic credentials of the administrative process itself. 297
V. SUPERIORITY OF THE PROGRESSIVE THEORY TO
THE WEBERIAN, COURT-CENTRIC THEORY
In this Part, I argue that the Progressive theory of the state
maps onto important aspects of our current institutional structure better than the Weberian, court-centric theory that supports the major questions doctrine. Despite the fact that the Progressive understanding of the state has largely faded from
memory, its institutional legacy of remains. The Progressive theory acknowledges that agencies resolve important value questions, while still respecting public participation and presidential
oversight as sources of democratic legitimacy. In our current administrative state, agencies do indeed frequently make decisions
that implicate important political, constitutional, and ethical
values. But we also have procedures that ensure that the agency
deliberates with the affected public when it settles such major
294. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Progressive Struggle with the Courts: A Problematic Asymmetry, in THE PROGRESSIVES’ CENTURY: POLITICAL REFORM, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE 65, 67–74 (Stephen Skowronek et al. eds., 2016).
295. See supra Part IV.B.
296. See supra Part IV.B.
297. See supra Part IV.B.
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questions. In Section A, I note numerous instances where agencies address questions of economic and political significance,
which suggests that the major questions doctrine conflicts with
a significant aspect of administrative practice. In Section B, I argue that the President provides additional democratic authority
to agency statutory interpretation, which can bolster agencies’
claims to address major questions. In Section C, I argue that
public input in the rulemaking process provides further democratic support for administrative interpretations, especially compared with a realistic assessment of the democratic credentials
of Congress and the courts.
A. THE AGENCY PRACTICE OF VALUE-ORIENTED STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The Progressives anticipated that administrative agencies
would not only identify efficient means to achieve statutory ends,
but also engage in a deeper normative inquiry about the meaning of those statutory ends in light of broader public norms. Our
current institutions reflect this vision. In the post–New Deal
context, where Congress routinely delegates broad rulemaking
power to administrative agencies, agencies will often engage
with fraught and profound questions of public philosophy when
they interpret and implement the law. To note a few famous examples: the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration’s travails with passive restraint requirements for auto
safety were bound up with deeply rooted American sensibilities
about motor vehicles as embodiments of individual autonomy. 298
The Department of Transportation’s (DOT) approval of highway
routes implicated the relative importance of park conservation,
racial equity, and local economic development. 299 The Supreme
Court’s development of the theory of disparate-impact discrimination relied upon the interpretations of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 300 which were grounded in
the EEOC’s considered position that discrimination included not
298. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO
SAFETY 111–13 (1990).
299. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1251, 1281 (1992).
300. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1970) (giving “great
deference” to the EEOC’s conclusion that professionally developed ability tests
must be “job-related”).
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only intentional bigotry, but also a “condition of pervasive exclusion.” 301 Decisions by the IRS on tax exemptions, 302 and the FCC
decisions on rate increases,303 have interpreted constitutional
norms of equal protection and statutory norms of gender and racial equality.
It would be too much to say that questions of political value
arise in every administrative action. But nor are such instances
anomalous. Scholarship on administrative constitutionalism
identifies numerous cases where agencies explicitly interpret
constitutional norms, implicitly interpret constitutional norms
through statutory interpretation, implement statutes that have
come to assume a quasi-constitutional status, or develop new understandings of foundational public norms in the course of performing their statutory duties.304 When agency interpretations
concern constitutional norms, or more broadly address social
problems that have drawn intense public interest, they plainly
address questions of deep economic and political significance. In
doing so, they mediate between the legal and the political process. As Jerry Mashaw argues, agencies routinely take into account “political struggles and political context” in their interpretation of statutes, since “agency use of this ‘political’ material is
a part of maintaining their democratic legitimacy. It is precisely
their job as agents of past congresses and sitting politicians to
synthesize the past with the present.” 305 Administrative policymaking is therefore not a technocratic exercise in statutory gapfilling, but a politically engaged effort to shape the meaning of
underdetermined legal norms.
The major questions doctrine’s presumption that Congress
does not intend agencies to make such decisions thus flies in the
face of a common aspect of agency practice. If rigorously implemented, the doctrine would prevent agencies from playing the
301. EEOC, “ THEY HAVE THE POWER—WE HAVE THE PEOPLE”: THE STATUS
OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSTON, TEXAS, 1970, at i (1970).

302. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–05 (1982).
303. Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 837–44
(2010).
304. See generally Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism,
91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013) (discussing examples of administrative constitutionalism and analyzing the legitimacy of the practice).
305. Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A
Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 501, 513 (2005).
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important role they have played to-date in advancing our understanding of the abstract legal commitments established by statute.
B. PRESIDENTIAL OVERSIGHT OF AGENCY STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The Progressives argued that the President has authority as
a spokesperson for public opinion to guide administrative implementation of statutory mandates. 306 At the same time, the Progressives did not advocate direct presidential control over administrative decision-making, aiming to separate the
administration of the law from short-term partisan policy preferences.307 Our case law and institutional arrangements reflect
this vision to a significant degree. In Chevron, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the President has an important, constitutionally authorized role to play in shaping administrative action:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 308

This aspect of the reasoning in Chevron mirrors the Progressives’ conception of the important role the President plays in
guiding administrative discretion according to his interpretation
of public opinion.
Chevron’s emphasis on presidential input has been complemented by the growth of regulatory review in the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Though this process began during the Reagan Administration as an antiregulatory
effort to restrict administrative output, 309 it has evolved since
then into a more sensitive process. Under the Obama Administration, the public values the President endorsed—such as “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”—can be
invoked by agencies to justify their regulatory course of action. 310
306. See supra notes 260–64 and accompanying text.
307. Id.
308. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
309. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 601 at 431–34 (1982).
310. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
at 101–02 (2012).
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Since executive agencies are required to submit any regulation
that has an economic impact of $100,000,000 or more to OIRA
for review, 311 as well as any guidance document with a similar
effect, 312 most agency interpretations that a court could plausibly construe as implicating a major question must be approved
by the White House. This means that most administrative answers to major questions will have the imprimatur of presidential approval,313 and consequently will benefit from the democratic credentials of the office. The practice of presidential
control in this respect furthers the Progressive ambition of guiding administration according to the President’s distillation of
public opinion.
The Trump Administration has retained the basic regulatory review framework developed under the Clinton and Obama
Administrations. 314 Other aspects of its regulatory review process, however, fundamentally conflict with the ideals of the Progressive state. Executive Order 13,771 requires administrative
agencies to rescind two rules for every one they promulgate. 315
It also requires that “the total incremental cost of all new regulations . . . be no greater than zero.” 316 The Executive Order in
this way commands aggressive deregulation, failing even to take
into account the benefits of regulations. Furthermore, it undermines rational deliberation with affected parties over the extent
and nature of regulation. If an agency is subject to a strict, numerical mandate to repeal more rules than they promulgate, and
to create no additional economic costs, they are unlikely to engage in a substantive debate over the merits of current and proposed policies. Executive Order 13,771 is thus a product of the

311. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in
5 U.S.C. § 601 at 638–42 (2000).
312. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and Budget,
to the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar.
4, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
memoranda/2009/m09-13.pdf.
313. Independent agencies are not covered by regulatory review. Exec. Order
No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 at 639 (2000).
314. Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (ordering
the “implementation of regulatory reform initiatives” including Executive Order
12866 and Executive Order 13563).
315. Exec. Order No. 13,771, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
316. Id. at § 2(b).
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Trump Administration’s attempt to “deconstruct[] . . . the administrative state.” 317 It aims to supplant pluralistic and reasoned argumentation over the means and ends of administrative
action with a single and overriding drive to reduce the quantity
and cost of federal rules. Whether that project succeeds may depend, in part, on whether courts, lawyers, scholars, and the public at large adequately recognize and defend the democratic conception of administration advanced and institutionalized by the
Progressives.
The Progressive theory of the state did not identify democratic legitimacy with presidential control of administration. Recall that Wilson argued that the President should guide administration according to his understanding of public opinion, but
give significant policy autonomy to agency heads and administrative judgment. 318 Unlike contemporary proponents of the unitary executive, 319 the Progressives did not maintain that the
President should dictate how administrative agencies would implement the laws.320 Instead, the Progressives sought to constrain presidential influence with statutory guidance, administrative autonomy, and public participation. The Progressive
theory therefore would not go as far as Kathryn Watts in asserting that the President may dictate the course of administrative
action based on articulated policy preferences. 321 Rather, given
its respect for the legislature as the preeminent representative
of public opinion,322 the Progressive theory better comports with
Kevin Stack’s understanding of presidential administration: if
an agency to which Congress has delegated rulemaking authority wishes a court to credit the President’s position in determining the democratic credentials of its statutory interpretations,
this input must be presented in a way that is consonant with the
317. Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the Administrative State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for
-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6
-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html.
318. See supra Part IV.B.
319. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s
Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570–99 (1994); Christopher S.
Yoo, et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 601, 730–31 (2005).
320. See Skowronek, supra note 260, at 2087–92.
321. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 57–60 (2009).
322. See supra notes 256–59 and accompanying text.

2018]

MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE

2079

statute’s purposes. 323 This approach ensures the deliberative integrity of administrative policymaking by anchoring all input—
from the President, political appointees, congressional committees, civil servants, and members of the public—to the common
reference point of statutory goals. More extreme forms of executive control risk displacing reasoned, participatory discourse
about the meaning of the law with the mere assertions of the
“will of the President,” exercising “authority without law.” 324
This Progressive vision comports to a large degree with the
law and organizational structure of the executive branch. As Peter Strauss has argued, the President is best understood as an
“overseer” of administration, rather than a “decider” of administrative policy. 325 The President and his agents may legitimately influence administrative policymaking through contacts
with agency officials. 326 But the President has no independent
and inherent lawmaking power. 327 Legislation may delegate
quasi-legislative function to his office, 328 but frequently will instead delegate such powers directly to another executive official
or administrative body. 329 In these cases, because the regulatory
power is vested in another actor, there is a strong case to be
made that the President’s policy preference does not have binding authority upon that actor. 330
323. See Stack, supra note 190, at 925–27.
324. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
325. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “ The Decider ”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).
326. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[W]e
do not believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or
the presence of Presidential power.”). But the President may not generally interfere in adjudicative proceedings affecting the rights of private parties, Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926), or intervene ex parte where administrative policymaking is to be made through methods of formal adjudication,
Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540
(9th Cir. 1993).
327. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587.
328. Id. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
329. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §7409(a) (2012) (“ The Administrator [of the EPA]
. . . shall by regulation promulgate . . . proposed national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards . . . .”).
330. Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465–72 (1987); Peter L. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 201 (1986); see Myers, 272 U.S. at 135 (“[T]here may be duties
so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular officer
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As a practical matter, the President can exert great pressure
on agency heads who serve at his pleasure. And such appointees
are, in any event, likely to share the President’s political perspective on many issues. But because the President may incur
political costs for removing an administrative leader for failure
to implement his preferred policy, and must, for most leadership
posts, secure Senate confirmation,331 his control even over executive departments is not absolute. 332 When it comes to “independent” commissions, such as the SEC or the FCC, whose commissioners can only be removed for cause, his control is more
attenuated. 333 Perhaps more importantly, civil-service protections prevent political appointees from simply dictating policy
outcomes that run afoul of tenured officials’ conception of their
legal obligations and rational public policy. 334 As Jon Michaels
argues, administrative agencies are not unitary, purely hierarchical actors working at the behest of their political leadership;
rather, they institutionalize an internal separation of powers between political officials, civil servants, and civil-society
groups.335
The Progressive theory of presidential influence thus comports with significant aspects of current administrative law and
executive practice. The President is a powerful spokesperson for
public opinion, who can legitimately influence the administrative process. At the same time, both the Progressive theory and
current constitutional and statutory law insulate administration
from total, pervasive, and direct presidential control. The major
questions doctrine eschews this moderate position, ignoring
presidential influence altogether. For example, in Brown & Williamson, it did not matter to the Court that the President had
as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise the officer ’s
interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance.”); Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (finding that the President
does not have power to instruct an executive official not to perform a statutory
duty). For the contrary argument, see Kagan, supra note 39, at 2320–31.
331. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
332. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 330, at 200.
333. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 607 (1935)
(“[T]he duties and function of the Federal Trade Commission are inconsistent
with an unrestricted power of removal in the President.”).
334. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 586 (1984).
335. See Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 227, 238–39 (2016).
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taken public ownership of the Agency’s decision to regulate tobacco.336 Rather, in the major questions cases, the Court narrows
its focus to legislative control alone, while ignoring the possibility that administrative agencies might draw deliberative democratic authority from presidential input.
C. AGENCY DELIBERATION WITH THE AFFECTED PUBLIC
The Progressives’ theory of administration goes well beyond
presidential accountability. More importantly, it maintains that
the public at large must be involved in the administrative process to ensure its democratic legitimacy. Our current institutions
reflect this to a significant degree, though problems remain. The
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure codified by the APA
institutionalizes the Progressive concern for public participation
in agency policymaking. In this rulemaking process, agencies
must publish any proposed rule in the Federal Register, and
then “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making” through written submissions.337 As Kenneth Culp
Davis described:
[This process is] one of the greatest inventions of modern government. . . . Affected parties who know facts that the agency may not
know or who have ideas or understanding that the agency may not
share have opportunity by quick and easy means to transmit the facts,
ideas, or understandings to the agency at the crucial time when the
agency’s positions are still fluid. The procedure is both democratic and
efficient. 338

The claim here is that notice-and-comment rulemaking can
parallel the legislative process “in microcosm” by creating a deliberative process between agency officials and the affected public. 339 As the Court recognized in Mead, notice-and-comment procedures tend to “foster . . . fairness and deliberation.” 340 Courts
then police this process to ensure that agencies draw reasonable
conclusions from the comments they receive, address all signifi-

336. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 330, at 2283 (describing how the FDA collaborated with the White House to prepare a final rule on tobacco regulation).
337. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
338. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 142 (3d ed. 1972).
339. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1712 (1975).
340. United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2178 (2001).
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cant comments, and ensure that all major policy choices are sufficiently “ventilated.” 341 This democratic function of notice-andcomment rulemaking was succinctly summarized by Judge
McGowan of the D.C. Circuit in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle: “[I]f
the Agency, in carrying out its essentially legislative task, has
infused the administrative process with the degree of openness,
explanation, and participatory democracy required by the APA,
it will thereby have negate[d] the dangers of arbitrariness and
irrationality in the formulation of rules.” 342 Notice-and-comment
rulemaking is therefore capable of institutionalizing the American Progressives’ core concern of developing a participatory administrative process. The procedure may help to engage the affected public in grappling with questions of political value that
have not been unambiguously settled by legislative enactment.
To be sure, the notice-and-comment procedure is not an
ideal deliberative process. The comment period itself may be a
kind of “Kabuki theater,” in the sense that it is “a highly stylized
process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something
which in real life takes place in other venues,” 343 such as informal consultations. Even though notice-and-comment is stylized,
however, the underlying dynamics of deliberative engagement
are no less real. The default participation requirements for rulemaking in the APA formalize, and render judicially reviewable,
a broader process of stakeholder engagement in our administrative state. 344 This process has become even more widely accessible with the advent of e-rulemaking, which allows anyone with
341. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 53–57 (1983) (holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration did not adequately explain why it rescinded a former safety requirement); Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d. 330, 338 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (“[T]he ‘concise general statement of basis and purpose’ . . . will enable us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings . . . .”); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568
F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (“It is not in keeping with the rational process to
leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”).
342. 590 F.2d 1011, 1027–28 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (internal quotations omitted).
343. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L. J. 1490, 1492
(1992).
344. See generally William Funk, Public Participation and Transparency in
Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV.
171 (2009) (describing the evolution and deepening of public participation in
administration); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making
Process: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
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an Internet connection to submit a comment on proposed
rules. 345 American administrative law requires a much higher
level of judicially reviewable public participation in rulemaking
than other liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom,
Germany, and the European Union as a whole. 346
The major questions doctrine does not even acknowledge
that agencies engage in this uniquely American deliberativedemocratic process. With its exclusive emphasis on legislation as
a source of democratic accountability, the major questions doctrine denies these aspects of the rulemaking process entirely. In
doing so, the Court blinds itself to sources of popular input that
may legitimate an administrative agency’s economically or politically significant policy choice. The problem with the doctrine is
therefore not merely that it undermines “expertise” and “accountability,” as Cass Sunstein argues,347 but that it discounts
and short-circuits rational public deliberation between administrative officials and the public at large.
It might be argued that, because of significant inequalities
of participation and influence in the administrative process, 348
participatory rulemaking does not add any democratic legitimacy to administrative interpretations of statutes. But the democratic credentials of the administrative process must be understood in comparison to the other institutions that might resolve
THEORY 245 (1998) (finding varying levels of public interest engagement in
rulemaking).
345. Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 355 (2004).
346. See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Participation and Expertise: Judicial Attitudes in Comparative Perspective, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 370,
370–74 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, & Blake Emerson, eds., 2d
ed. 2017) (finding a much stronger emphasis on public participation in U.S. administrative law than in the United Kingdom and European Union); SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 10 (1995) (comparing the United
States’ relatively participatory rulemaking process to Germany’s corporatist
and largely unreviewable rulemaking procedure).
347. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 243.
348. See, e.g., Wendy Warner, et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011)
(“[A]t least some publicly important rules . . . may be influenced heavily by regulated parties, with little to no counterpressure from the public interest.”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128 (2006) (finding
that business commenters have important influence over the content of final
rules).

2084

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:2019

major questions. Inequality of influence is, unfortunately, endemic to our entire political process, including Congress. 349 If
significant degrees of inequality of public influence were completely fatal to democratic legitimacy, Congress would have no
democratic authority to legislate. The major questions doctrine
would therefore not serve a democratic function by incentivizing
Congress to resolve major policy disputes.
Moreover, the major questions doctrine gives the judiciary
the primary responsibility to settle major questions if the statutory text is ambiguous. Especially in a context where Congress
is not likely to correct the judiciary’s interpretation of a major
ambiguity,350 the doctrine functions to empower the courts, rather than Congress. Courts, however, are facially less wellsuited than Congress to promote democratic forms of participation. Their constitutional function is to adjudicate cases and controversies, and protect the rights of individuals and minorities,
rather than to settle polycentric policy-disputes.351 Limits on
standing to challenge administrative action also create inequalities of judicial access between regulated parties and public-interest organizations, since public-interest organizations have
more difficulty showing a concrete and particularized injury

349. See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 259 (2008) (finding that Senators are twice
as responsive to the opinions of high-income constituents as middle-income constituents, and not at all responsive to the opinions of low-income constituents);
Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites,
Interest Groups, and Average Citizens, 12 PERSP. POL. 564, 564 (2014) (“[E]conomic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens
and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence.”).
350. Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without
Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 502 (2015) (“[T]he modern Congress has
increasingly dis-empowered itself. It consistently fails to update or revise old
statutes even when those enactments are manifestly outdated or, as actually
administered, have assumed contours that the original Congress never contemplated and the current Congress would not countenance . . . .”).
351. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 394–404 (1978) (arguing that judicial adjudication is best suited for
resolving binary disputes between rights holders rather than “polycentric” policy questions, involving multiple considerations and parties, which are best settled by democratic decision procedures or administrative management); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFF. U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“[T]he law of standing roughly
restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals
and minorities against impositions of the majority . . . .”).
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than does the regulated community. 352 Because the major questions doctrine merely empowers the judiciary, rather than Congress or agencies, to resolve major questions, it does not promote
a comparatively more democratic form of policymaking than
would exist absent the doctrine’s constraint on administrative
discretion.
Worse still, the major questions doctrine exacerbates inequalities in rulemaking rather than redressing them. Because
the doctrine generally forbids agencies from making decisions of
great economic and political significance, it encourages agencies
to explain themselves in technocratic terms, even if significant
questions of value are at issue. If agencies know that courts will
decline to defer to them if they detect agency consideration of
important questions of political value, they will invariably explain their interpretations of statutory ambiguities in a way that
makes them appear purely technical. Inequalities of influence
are at their height when rulemaking concerns such apparently
technical, rather than normative, questions, because regulated
groups tend to have the most nuts-and-bolts information about
the relevant subject matter. 353 The technocratic method of review established by State Farm already encourages agencies to
explain themselves in value-neutral, quasi-scientific policy discourse, which is difficult for the lay public to access, participate
in, and influence. 354 The major questions doctrine doubles down
on this trend by barring agencies from engaging in anything
more than interstitial gap-filling between clearly established
statutory norms. The doctrine, thus, is likely to increase inequalities in the rulemaking process, shifting it into a technocratic rather than value-oriented form of policy discourse. This retreat
352. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577–78 (1992) (limiting standing for persons and groups who are not the object of the challenged
government action, and finding “citizen suit” statutory standing as insufficient
to confer Article III standing). Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?
Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 221 (1992)
(“The need to show an injury will complicate [suits by environmental organizations], and some occasions will arise where no plaintiff can be found. Moreover,
regulatory cases will arise in which the insistence on an actual injury, as understood in Lujan, will bar action altogether.”).
353. Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1379 (2010) (noting that regulated industries have
more access to technical information, and so can exercise undue influence over
agency process relative to public interest stakeholders).
354. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORD. L. REV. 17, 29 (2001) (describing the form of reason-giving courts expect of agencies as “too cramped”
and “too narrow,” and thus sometimes failing “to respect our humanity”).
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into technocracy will further imperil democratic transparency,
because important value choices will be kept from public view,
and dressed up in the supposedly neutral language of expertise.
The citizenry will then find itself alienated from the discourse in
which its interests are supposedly expressed and advanced.
D. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE AS AN OBSTACLE TO
EFFICIENT PURSUIT OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The previous Sections have shown that the major questions
doctrine imperils democratic legitimacy by ignoring public participation in, and presidential oversight of, the administrative
process. This doctrine also undermines democracy in the more
basic sense that it can stymie efficient bureaucratic performance. Recall that the Progressives were motivated to build and
legitimate an administrative state because they wanted to furnish the requisites for public freedom, as understood by the people themselves. 355 They believed that administrative agencies
had the institutional capacity to bring governmental power to
bear efficiently and on a massive scale to further social emancipation.356 By contrast, the major questions doctrine shows the
perils of privileging judicial control without due regard for this
practical need of speedy administrative resolution of social problems. In Brown & Williamson, the FDA, with its tobacco and cigarette regulations, was attempting to mitigate a public health
crisis which caused the deaths of roughly 400,000 Americans
every year. 357 The Court acknowledged the force of this concern,
but nonetheless struck down the rule as outside of the Agency’s
statutory authority. 358 In this instance, the laudable concern
with ensuring that the public effectively deliberates over the
commitments that guide state action delayed an urgent intervention into a serious public health issue. Cases like this suggest
that the major questions exception has not struck an appropriate
balance between deliberative integrity and efficient protection of
the public interest.
*****
The Progressive conception of the state thus comports with
salient and normatively significant aspects of our current state
355.
356.
357.
(2000).
358.

See Wood, supra note 236.
See Anderson, supra note 253.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127–28
Id. at 161.
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structure in a way that the major questions doctrine and its attending political theory do not. Agencies engage with conventional sources of statutory interpretation, alongside a wider set
of politically sensitive tools that serve the same underlying purpose: to articulate public opinion in the form of political action.
Unless courts respect the wide ambit of agencies’ deliberative
and interpretive competencies, they are liable to frustrate, rather than bolster, the democratic credentials of the state as a
whole.
VI. REFORMING MAJOR QUESTIONS
The major questions doctrine rests on the important constitutional principle that basic value choices should be subject to
public input, scrutiny, and critique. But it then imports other
auxiliary assumptions to conclude that the best way to enforce
such a deliberative process is for courts to presume that Congress would not delegate such questions to agencies. The doctrine assumes that the judiciary is the preeminent interpreter of
Congress’s choices of principle and policy, and that agencies
should be restricted to the purely instrumental task of implementing these clearly established goals. I have argued that this
vision of the administrative state is neither descriptively accurate nor normatively appealing. I turned to the American Progressives’ democratic conception of administration to argue that
agencies can play an important role in public deliberation about
value choices. Legislation, in this view, is not the sole legal repository in which public value choices are to be found. Statutes
are only one important part of a discursive process that specifies
content of public purposes.
Chevron acknowledged that many foundational questions of
policy are simply not determined by statute, and thus must be
fleshed out with the input of the president, administrators, and
the affected public. The major questions doctrine shuts out these
noncongressional and nonstatutory sources of public input and
accountability, and forces agencies into a purely technocratic
mode of explanation that belies the normative character of many
of their determinations. We therefore need a better doctrine—
one that recognizes the important interest in reinforcing democratic governance in administrative law but does not trade on
inflated notions of judicial competence and deflated conceptions
of administrative agencies’ ethical and participatory capacities.
In Section A, I describe my innovation. In Section B, I apply it to
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several of the major questions cases: Brown & Williamson, Gonzales, King, and Texas v. United States.
A. A PROPOSAL TO REFORM THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE
My proposal is this: major questions should be resolved by
agencies only through interpretive procedures that are responsive to public input on the questions at issue. When a court reviews an agency interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that
raises questions of vast economic and political significance, it
should defer to the agency’s interpretation only if: (1) it was
promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking, or another procedure of comparable deliberative intensity; and (2) the
relevant questions of economic and political significance the
court identifies have been properly “ventilated” in the deliberative process that precedes the promulgation of the interpretation.359 The rule thus follows United States v. Mead Corp. in
treating a congressional grant of rulemaking authority as a
“good indication” that Congress intended to leave the interpretive question to the agency. 360 As Jon Michaels observes, Mead
instructs courts “to accord less deference to unilaterally arrivedat agency interpretations than to those interpretations that reflect the robust participation of agency leaders, civil servants,
and members of the public.” 361 But my proposed approach does
not, like Mead, treat the agencies’ power to set binding norms as
the touchstone for assessing the level of deference owed. Even if
an agency does not have or use rulemaking authority, its opinion
on major questions within its subject-matter jurisdiction should
be accorded great weight if its official interpretation meets the
above criteria of discursive rationality and value ventilation.
Conversely, an agency would not receive Chevron deference—
even if it did have and use such rulemaking authority—if it did
not use procedures meeting these same criteria.
Such a standard would require agencies to state explicitly
what major questions were at issue, thus heightening the transparency of public decision-making. It would encourage agencies
always to consider what significant public norms might be involved in their rulemaking, lest a reviewing court deem that the
issue was in fact one of major significance and fault the agency
359. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
360. 533 U.S. 218, 228–30 (2001).
361. Michaels, supra note 335, at 273.
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for failing to address the relevant political questions. It would
also encourage agencies to make significant shifts in policy
through the rulemaking procedure rather than through interpretive rules or other guidance documents, which can be promulgated without public input. 362 Such interpretations, even if
promulgated in furtherance of the agencies’ delegated lawmaking authority, would not necessarily qualify for deference if the
courts found that a major question was at play. Only if agencies
documented a process of extensive public input over the relevant
value questions would Chevron deference apply. This approach
would allow agencies to resolve important policy questions, but
would insist that they do so in a deliberative, inclusive, and
transparent fashion. In this way, value-oriented public discourse
would be reinforced better than it currently is under the major
questions doctrine’s court-centric, technocracy-forcing approach.
This proposal is a workable but nonetheless significant modification of the jurisprudence on agency statutory interpretation.
Chevron deference applies not only to agency interpretations
promulgated through rulemaking or adjudication, but sometimes also to other agency interpretations in the exercise of their
delegated powers. 363 In some cases, therefore, an opinion letter
issued without notice-and-comment receives Chevron deference.364 In addition, an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is ordinarily given even more than Chevron deference—
“controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.” 365 This allows agencies to change policy
without the deliberative benefits of the notice-and-comment procedure.366 My proposal, by contrast, would only grant deference

362. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b)(3)(A) (2012).
363. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–
257, 263 (1995)) (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we
have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”).
364. See NationsBank, 513 U.S. at 256–57.
365. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
366. “Auer deference encourages agencies to be ‘vague in framing regulations, with the plan of issuing interpretations to create the intended new law
without observance of notice and comment procedures.’” Decker v. Nw. Envtl.
Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN. L. J. 1, 11–12 (1996)).
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to agency interpretations raising a question of economic or political significance if promulgated through notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures, or a process with comparable deliberative features, including: unrestricted access by any and all parties to the decision-making process; agency deliberation which
rationally responds to all relevant input it receives; and full documentation of how the agency reached its conclusion in light of
that deliberation. If an agency’s interpretive rule raises a significant value question, the interpretation would need to engage
with and respond to public comments on that question in order
to be given significant weight by a court.
For example, the Attorney General’s classification of drugs
used in physician-assisted suicide in Gonzales would not have
been owed deference, because it was not promulgated through
rulemaking or any comparable procedure. 367 As the Court noted,
in the case of the interpretive rule on medications used in assisted suicide, there was an “apparent absence of any consultation with anyone outside the Department of Justice who might
aid in a reasoned judgment.” 368 This interpretive rule therefore
lacked any of the trappings of informal rulemaking, and concerned an issue subject to intensive, contemporaneous, and ethically charged public debate. Courts should presume that Congress did not intend an agency to resolve such an important issue
without extensive and politically substantive public input in the
administrative process.
The policy reason for this doctrinal adjustment would be to
encourage agencies to make use of rulemaking when they make
significant policy shifts. This approach acknowledges that it
would be very costly, if not impossible, to prevent agencies from
determining important questions of policy altogether. The time
Congress would spend in settling every policy question in one
domain would be paid for by inattention to other areas that require legislative attention. 369 Nor do courts have the time, institutional resources, or expertise to settle all of the problems left
unresolved by the statutory framework. 370 It seems necessary,
367. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258–59 (2005).
368. Id. at 269.
369. ESKRIDGE, supra note 126, at 936 (“[ F ]rom an efficiency standpoint,
Congress lacks the time to resolve innumerable first-order implementation
questions . . . .”).
370. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d. 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“We reach
our decision after interminable record searching (and considerable soul searching). We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably
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therefore, to allow agencies a legitimate role in settling politically significant questions. My proposed revision to the major
questions doctrine attempts to ensure that these major administrative decisions are accompanied by sufficient public deliberation, consultation, and reasoned decision-making. It makes use
of our existing procedural repertoire to ensure that administrative action remains firmly tethered to an ongoing process of public opinion-formation and will-formation. At the same time, it
does not violate the basic principle of administrative law that
agencies are generally free to choose which powers to use among
those that Congress has granted them.371 Instead of mandating
the use of certain procedures, my approach calibrates the level
of deference owed to the agency according to the deliberative intensity of the process it elects to use to reach its interpretive conclusion.
The legal justification for this approach is similar to that of
the major questions doctrine, but applied to the APA itself.
Courts should interpret the APA in light of a presumption that
Congress would not allow agencies to make major shifts in policy
without significant deliberative engagement with the affected
public. The legislative history of the APA supports this construction. As the Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated in
describing the Act’s rulemaking provisions, “matters of great import, or those where the public submission of facts will be either
useful to the agency or a protection to the public, should naturally be accorded more elaborate public procedures” 372 than rudimentary notice-and-comment. Congress thus sought to protect
the under-enforced norm of nondelegation by ensuring that
agencies make their procedures adequate to the political significance of the question presented. While courts may not require
agencies to use more elaborate procedures than those required

give its thousands of pages. We have adopted a simple and straight-forward
standard of review, probed the agency’s rationale, studied its references (and
those of appellants), endeavored to understand them where they were intelligible (parts were simply impenetrable), and on close questions given the agency
the benefit of the doubt out of deference for the terrible complexity of its job. We
are not engineers, computer modelers, economists or statisticians, although
many of the documents in this record require such expertise—and more.”).
371. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that
lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
372. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 15 (1945).
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by the Act, 373 they might nonetheless calibrate the level of deference to the deliberative credentials of the rulemaking proceeding. If an agency not only goes through the rudimentary motions
of notice-and-comment, but gives a particularly thorough explanation of its policy choice that engages with the political controversies it has engendered, the courts ought to respect the
agency’s interpretation of legislative ambiguities.
A similar approach might apply to other agency statements
of policy. Though Congress sought to heighten procedural protections for significant matters, it also gave agencies the flexibility to use other policymaking tools besides rulemaking and adjudication. When issuing “interpretative rules” or “general
statements of policy” agencies are not obliged to go through notice-and-comment. 374 But this does not mean that such guidance
documents should always be promulgated without some form of
public participation and reasoned explanation. The Senate Report on the APA suggested that an agency might “undertake
public procedures” where it was “useful to them or helpful to the
public.” 375 Similarly, in 2007, the Office of Management and
Budget required executive agencies to solicit “public comment”
on “significant guidance documents,” defined as guidance with
annual economic impacts of $100,000,000 or more or other major
legal, policy, or budgetary effects. 376 This legislative history and
executive directive provide a framework for analyzing guidance
documents raising major economic or political questions. The
twin purposes of procedural protection and regulatory flexibility
could be balanced by withholding deference to guidance that concerns a major question, unless the agency has elected to promulgate such interpretations through a sufficiently deliberative and
participatory procedure. In this way, courts might disentangle
the question of the document’s “binding effect” from its legitimacy as a product of reasoned and participatory governance.377

373. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (“[G]enerally speaking [the notice-and-comment] section of the Act established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to
have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”).
374. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012).
375. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 14 (1945).
376. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance
Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3439–40 (2007).
377. Gen. Elec. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Robert
A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
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Under my proposed revision of the major questions doctrine,
judicial deference to an agency’s resolution of a major question
would require not only the use of deliberative decision-making
procedures, but would also require that the relevant economic or
political questions had been rationally addressed by the agency
on the record. Such an approach would adapt Chevron’s step two
into a requirement for deliberative rationality: an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision implicating a major question would be reasonable only if it was well-justified in terms of
the purposes of the statute and the input of affected parties. 378
In other words, a regulation’s “concise general statement of . . .
basis and purpose”379 would have to discuss the major questions
at issue, taking into account any relevant concerns raised by
commenters. This requirement would not be a modification of
current administrative law doctrine, but merely a straightforward application of the existing rules to major questions. When,
in informal rulemaking, an administrative decision-maker “is
obliged to make policy judgments where no factual certainties
exist or where facts alone do not provide the answer, he should
so state and go on to identify the considerations he found persuasive.” 380 In the context of major questions cases, courts
should ensure that the agency’s argumentation is not purely
technical, but actually raises and addresses these questions in
its final rule. If the agency fails to do so, this will show that the
agency has not made use of the deliberation-reinforcing capacities of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and thus cannot claim
deference for its preferred interpretation of the law.
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1311, 1355 (1992)).
378. Mark Seidenfeld proposes that Chevron step two should generally be
treated in this way, demanding greater judicial scrutiny of the deliberative integrity of the agency’s decision-making process. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 125–30 (1994). I would not urge that
step two of Chevron should always require intensive review. Such an approach
would create additional obstacles to efficient bureaucratic performance. When
it comes to ordinary administrative interpretations without significant political
consequences, the Progressive theory would require that state autonomy be valued above deliberative democratic engagement. When it comes to major questions, however, deliberative democratic legitimacy has greater importance, because profound and divisive value questions are at play. In these cases, courts
should increase their scrutiny of the agency’s reasoning process.
379. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
380. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 476 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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B. APPLYING THE APPROACH TO THE MAJOR QUESTIONS CASES
Consider how this aspect of the test would play out in some
of the major questions cases discussed in Part I. Since the courts
do not always specify the economic and political questions at issue, but only allude to the import of the challenged interpretation, I will attempt to offer a best guess. In the tobacco regulations at issue in Brown & Williamson, one question of political
significance was arguably: how should the agency balance competing consideration of the public health risk caused by smoking,
on the one hand, and public values of individual responsibility
and choice, on the other? 381 Responding to public comments on
this topic, the final rule addressed this question head on:
[The] FDA believes that adults should continue to have the freedom to
choose whether or not they will use tobacco products. However, because
nicotine is addictive, the choice of continuing to smoke, or use smokeless tobacco, may not be truly voluntary. Because abundant evidence
shows that nicotine is addictive and that children are not equipped to
make a mature choice about using tobacco products, the agency believes children under age 18 must be protected from this addictive substance. 382

In the FDA’s 223-page final rule, responding to over 700,000
comments, the agency addressed other important political questions such as the relationship between parents, children, and
federal regulation, 383 the allocation of regulatory responsibilities
between the state and federal government, 384 and the commercial rights of retailers. 385
The agency also referenced President Clinton’s Wilsonian
engagement with the public over the subject matter of the
rule.386 It considered public comments addressed directly to him
by a coalition of medical associations,387 remarks to the press explaining the regulatory plan,388 and the input of the Ad Hoc
Committee of the President’s Cancer Panel. 389 The rule is thus a
good example of an agency embracing the Progressive conception
381. 529 U.S. 120, 148 (2000).
382. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,418
(Aug. 28, 1995).
383. Id. at 44,421.
384. Id. at 44,430.
385. Id. at 44,434.
386. See supra notes 264–67 and accompanying text.
387. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,418.
388. Id. at 44,419.
389. Id. at 44,463.
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of the administrative state. The agency deliberated over the public norms implicated by the rule, responded in rational fashion
to a great volume of public comments, and referenced the President’s supervisory authority without becoming a mere instrument of his will.
A court might, of course, find that other important issues of
economic and political significance were not addressed in the
rulemaking. Or it might find that traditional principles of statutory construction barred the agency’s interpretation, irrespective
of the fact that major questions were involved. But the great virtue of using a notice-and-comment rulemaking on such a highprofile issue is that it is likely that commentators will raise most,
if not all, relevant issues, and therefore the agency will have a
legal responsibility to address them. The focus of judicial review
of such major regulatory cases should be on ensuring that the
agency forthrightly engaged with the relevant policy questions,
rather than presuming that the court is competent to resolve
these questions without according institutional respect to the
agency’s deliberative engagement with the President and the affected public.
King v. Burwell offers a starkly different case.390 There, the
IRS had promulgated a regulation which curtly responded to
some commenters’ arguments that the language of the Affordable Care Act limits health care tax credits to those who enrolled
on State Exchanges. 391 In a single paragraph, the IRS simply
asserted that the statutory language supported the interpretation that tax credits were also available on federal exchanges,
and that the legislative history “does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit the premium tax credit to State Exchanges.” 392 The IRS concluded that its proposed interpretation
was “consistent with the language, purpose, and structure of . . .
the Affordable Care Act as a whole.” 393
These statements are conclusory. The IRS did not actually
offer an argument on the major issue the Court subsequently addressed, namely whether the statutory purpose or scheme required the availability of tax credits on federal as well as state
exchanges. Given that the IRS did not engage in a substantive
390. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
391. Id. at 2487.
392. Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30,377, 30,378
(May 23, 2012) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602 (2015)).
393. Id.
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discussion of the policy questions implicated by one of the “Act’s
key reforms,” 394 it was appropriate for the Court not to defer to
the agency’s interpretation of the statutory ambiguity. Had the
IRS considered the policy implications of reserving subsidies for
state exchanges alone; had it offered a detailed discussion of the
purpose of the ACA in light of its overall structure and its legislative history; had it acknowledged background concerns of economic liberty and federalism that had arguably animated the
King litigation; in that case, the Court ought to have deferred to
the IRS’s interpretation. But the rule has much more the quality
of an interstitial exercise in gap-filling than an engagement over
disputed issues of policy. In other words, the meaning of this provision might have indeed become “a case for the IRS,” 395 but the
IRS did not in fact demonstrate, on the record, the degree of deliberative attention that would have merited judicial deference
to its resolution of the major question.
Similarly, in Texas v. United States, the Obama Administration promulgated the DAPA program not through rulemaking
but through an enforcement memorandum.396 The agency did
not document any kind of robust public consultation process that
would have indicated deliberative-democratic engagement over
the shift in immigration policy. DHS’s failure to record any such
procedure undermined its democratic authority to undertake a
significant policy shift without explicit congressional authorization. This does not mean that the Fifth Circuit was correct that
the Department’s interpretation of the law was invalid. It simply
means that a reviewing court would have no good reason to defer
to DHS’s interpretation of the INA under these circumstances.
This approach might also help to adjudicate the dispute between dissenting and concurring opinions in United Telecomm.
Recall that Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Brown argued in dissent that the Open Internet Order was unlawful because there
was no express statutory authority for the regulation of Internet
service providers as common carriers. 397 The concurrence argued
that the statute was ambiguous and permitted the FCC’s interpretation. 398 In addition, the concurrence gestured at the extraordinary level of engagement with the Commission’s process,
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
Id.
Memorandum from Johnson, supra note 106, at 3–4.
See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
Id.
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noting that “[t]he FCC received the views of some four million
commenters before adopting the rule.” 399 In the approach I have
proposed, the extraordinary number of public comments would
provide evidence that issues of great political moment were implicated by the order. The court could therefore grant Judge Kavanaugh’s point that the interpretation at issue was a major
one—implicating considerable economic issues as well as public
interests like open and equal access to means of political communication and debate—but then evaluate the quality of the
rulemaking record to see if these kinds of concerns had been discussed with reasonable discernment by the FCC. The court
would not consider whether the Commission’s discussion of the
values implicated was, by the court’s own lights, right or wrong,
but only whether it had engaged with any serious moral and economic arguments raised in the rulemaking in a more than rote
and perfunctory manner.
Under the approach I am advancing here, it does not matter
whether such a major policy decision is categorized by the agency
as an enforcement memorandum, a rule, or a general statement
of policy. If an administrative policy is promulgated under any
of these headings, and a court determines that the policy shift
implicates a question of deep economic and political significance,
the agency must have documented a value-oriented process of
public engagement for its interpretations of statutory ambiguities to qualify for judicial deference.
CONCLUSION
Major questions will continue to surface regularly in administrative activity. Under the Trump Administration, administrative agencies are working with vigor to reverse many of the policies implemented under the previous Administration. For
example, agencies under the Trump Administration have rescinded the Obama Administration’s deferred action programs
for undocumented immigrants, 400 proposed to rescind the 2015

399. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
400. Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Memorandum on Rescission of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled
“Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to
the United States as Children,” (Sept. 5, 2017), https://dhs.gov/news/2017/09/
05/memorandum-rescission-daca.
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Clean Water Rule, 401 and reevaluated rules regulating for-profit
educational institutions 402 and campus sexual assault and harassment.403 Judges can find, and indeed have found, 404 questions
of deep economic and political significance in such regulatory actions without much difficulty. When they do so, they should take
care to observe the basic deliberative principles that legitimate
administrative activity in our Progressive state. They should not
reflexively assume that the implication of such value choices precludes deference to the agency, and permits the court itself to
determine the issue de novo without any solicitude for administrative judgment. Nor, however, should they end their inquiry at
the finding of a statutory ambiguity and a delegation of lawmaking authority to an administrative agency. Instead, courts
should only defer to the agency if the agency has reached its interpretation through an open, inclusive, and rational discussion
of the policy choices at issue. They should not defer to hastily
drafted and nonconsultative declarations that have failed to engage the considered judgment of the persons they affect or respond to their concerns in a reasoned fashion. In this way, courts
can respect the institutional competence of agencies to interpret
401. Dep’t of Def., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Definition of “Waters of the United
States”—Recodification of Pre-existing Rules, Proposed Rule (June 27, 2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-06/documents/wotus_
prepublication_version.pdf.
402. Dep’t of Educ., Press Release, Secretary DeVos Announces Regulatory
Reset To Protect Students, Taxpayers, Higher Ed Institutions (June 14, 2017),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-announces
-regulatory-reset-protect-students-taxpayers-higher-ed-institutions.
403. Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter (Sept. 22,
2017) (rescinding Dear Colleague Letter on Sexual Violence, issued by the Office
for Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Education, dated April 4, 2011 and
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Sexual Violence, issued by the Office for
Civil Rights at the U.S. Department of Education, dated April 29, 2014), https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-title-ix-201709.pdf; Dep’t of
Educ., Press Release, Dep’t of Educ. Issues New Interim Guidance on Campus
Sexual Misconduct, (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/
department-education-issues-new-interim-guidance-campus-sexual
-misconduct.
404. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
279 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting a preliminary injunction
against the Trump Administration’s rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals program). In finding that the rescission was not “committed to agency
discretion by law,” and therefore unreviewable, the court noted: “the agency has
ended a program which has existed for five years affecting 689,800 enrollees.
Importantly, major policy decisions are quite different from day-to-day agency
nonenforcement decisions.” Id. at 1029–30 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
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public purposes, without abdicating their responsibility to ensure that We the People retain authorship over the rules that
bind us.

